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Victims’ Participation at the
International Criminal Court: Are
Concessions of the Court Clouding
the Promise?
By Christine H. Chung∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

No single legal issue at the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) has garnered as much attention as the manner in which the
ICC judges have interpreted the right of victims to participate in
proceedings. It was a major innovation—many would say the major innovation—of the Court to grant to victims a right they had
never previously enjoyed in any prior international criminal tribunal: the right to participate in court proceedings by expressing
“views and concerns” through their own legal representatives. The
first decision on the topic issued by the ICC judges, in January
2006, established that the unprecedented right would be interpreted
expansively. Pre-Trial Chamber I held that victims would be
granted a general right to participate in the investigation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), in addition to any future
case, while conceding that the Rome Statute—the treaty which
created the ICC—nowhere expressly required the granting of this
general right. Since that decision, the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers of the ICC have continued to endorse a broad approach to
permitting victims’ participation, while failing to reach agreement
on the boundaries of that participation, or the standards by which
applications to participate should be evaluated.
The end of 2007 saw two significant developments. First,
there was growing evidence, noted also by observers outside the
ICC, that the system of victims’ participation established in the
∗
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early decisions of the Court might be failing in its most central objective of providing effective participation to victims. Specifically,
the first five hundred or so applications to participate in investigation and pre-trial proceedings had jammed in the machinery of the
proceedings. These hundreds of applications were submitted by
individuals among the massive numbers of victims of the conflicts
under investigation by the ICC: in the Darfur region of The Sudan,
the DRC, northern Uganda and the Central African Republic
(“CAR”). The record of proceedings showed that applicants typically waited for over a year to learn whether they would obtain the
“status of victim,” a status which conferred only eligibility to participate in specific proceedings. Less than a hundred victims had
obtained even this theoretical right to participate nearly two years
after the first decision on victims’ participation. From those eligible to participate, moreover, less than a handful of applicants had
meaningfully participated in any specific ICC proceeding.
On January 23, 2008, two years after the first decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I, came the second development. Noting that
various Chambers of the Court had interpreted the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”), and the Regulations of the ICC “in a significantly
different manner,” pre-trial judges assigned to the Darfur and DRC
situations granted leave to appeal the question of whether they had
correctly interpreted the governing rules to permit them to grant a
“procedural status of victim,” or the theoretical right to participate,
during the investigative and pre-trial stages of proceedings.1 The
judges also sought, rather poignantly, given the persistent backlog
of applications to participate, Appeals Chamber review on the
question of: “how applications for participation at the investigation

1
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-118, Decision on Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the
Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation
86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory
Materials by the Prosecutor,” Public, 7-8 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 23, 2008)
[hereinafter First Darfur Grant of Appeal]; Situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-438, Decision on Request for Leave to
Appeal the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor,” Public, 7-8 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter First DRC
Grant of Appeal].
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stage of a situation and the pre-trial stage of a case must be dealt
with.”2
One ICC judge has cautioned against activism in broadening
the victims’ participation right granted by the Rome Statute. On
January 18, 2008, the Trial Chamber assigned to conduct the ICC’s
first trial ruled that victims of any crime committed in the DRC
and within the jurisdiction of the Court could potentially participate in the trial, although the trial itself involves only a single former DRC militia leader, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”), who
faces charges of child conscription, child enlistment, and use of
children in hostilities.3 Writing in dissent, the Honorable René
Blattman reasoned primarily that it transgressed “fundamental
principles of criminal law, such as the principle of legality, to not
link the status of victim and consequent rights of participation to
the charges confirmed against the accused.”4 Judge Blattman
found it “necessary to state, first and foremost, . . . that victims’
participation is not a concession of the Bench, but rather a right
accorded to victims by the [Rome] Statute.”5
This article posits that the framework for victims’ participation established in the first years of the ICC has proven to be unworkable and is falling short, most importantly, in delivering
meaningful participation to victims, the intended beneficiaries.
The source of the failing, moreover, has been precisely the tendency of the ICC’s judicial decisions to grant concessions rather
than observe the compromises reached during the negotiation of
the Rome Statute, when it was fully foreseen that the innovation of
victim’s participation could, if poorly defined or administered,
overwhelm the core mandate of prosecuting and trying perpetrators
of atrocities. The record of the ICC’s early years demonstrates that
thousands of pages and thousands of hours (likely representing a
substantial number of euro), have been expended in delivering actual participation in proceedings on behalf of very few victims.
2

See First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 8; First DRC Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 8.
3
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
Decision on Victims’ Participation, Public, ¶¶ 93-95 (Trial Chamber I, Jan. 18,
2008) [hereinafter Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation].
4
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge René Blattman to Decision on Victim’s Participation, Public, ¶ 21 (Appeals Chamber, Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter
J. Blattman Dissent to Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation].
5
See id. ¶ 13.
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The call for new ideas or shifts in direction, including to the Appeals Chamber, is timely.
Although it was never expected that meaningful victims’
participation would be incorporated into complex international
criminal trials without difficulty, it would be unfortunate for the
ICC to fail to adapt in response to experience gained. After describing the ICC’s performance in providing meaningful victims’
participation to date, and exploring the sources for the shortcomings in that performance, this article attempts to answer the question of how the ICC might alter its manner of “dealing with” applications to participate as victims in ICC proceedings. Finally, it is
logical that ICC prosecutions will remain extremely narrow in
scope, in relation to the underlying conflicts, criminality and victimization, and therefore that victims may continue to find participation in ICC proceedings a blunt instrument for fully vindicating
their interests. The article accordingly suggests ways that victims
and victim representatives might: (1) obtain more meaningful and
extensive participation in ICC proceedings; and (2) better capitalize on the existence of ICC investigations and cases to disseminate
views and concerns, inside and outside the Court, in the cause of
bringing accountability and vindicating victims’ interests.
II. ICC JURISPRUDENCE ON VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION

¶7

At the time of the writing of this article, the true nature of the
right being provided to individuals seeking to participate in ICC
proceedings is the entitlement to stand in a queue, for longer than a
year, to obtain a theoretical participation privilege which most
likely will never be converted to an actual right to express views
and concerns in court proceedings. The War Crimes Research Office of American University Washington College of Law
(“WCRO”), in the first comprehensive review of the operation of
the ICC victim participation framework, described in late 2007 that
the ICC system has “consumed a substantial portion of the Court’s
resources since January 2006,” while delivering “largely hypothetical” participation to a “limited number of victims,” making it
“questionable whether the Pre-Trial Chambers have struck a reasonably effective balance between the restorative goals of the ICC
victim participation scheme and the [Rome Statute] drafters’ con-
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cerns about efficiency and fairness.”6 Victims’ representatives are
currently among those expressing doubt and concern about the
workability of the ICC victim participation scheme.7 To understand how this state of affairs came about, it is necessary to explore
the development of the law regarding victims’ participation at the
ICC. It is also helpful to trace the evolution of the parties’ objections to the emerging framework.
A. The Negotiations Creating the ICC and the Balance Struck in
the Rome Statute
¶8

The issue of victims’ participation was prominent during the
negotiations at which the Rome Statute took shape. Nongovernmental organizations, including groups advocating the
rights of victims, were indeed a powerful force in ensuring that the
ICC became a reality.8 Negotiators agreed upon the major innovation of conferring upon victims, for the first time in any internationalized criminal court, rights to participate in proceedings and to
obtain reparations.9 The granting of a right to participate in proceedings, independent of the right to obtain recompense, recog6

WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW,
VICTIM PARTICIPATION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 5 (2007)
[hereinafter WCRO Report].
7
See, e.g., Sudan Victim Lawyers recount their experiences with the ICC so far,
ACCESS: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (Victims’ Rights Working Group, London, Eng.), Issue No. 9, Summer/Autumn
2007, at 1, 7 [hereinafter VRWG Article re Darfur Applicants]; Katy Glassborow, Victim Participation in ICC Cases Jeopardised, AFRICA REPORT NO. 148
(Institute of War and Peace Reporting, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 20, 2007 [hereinafter IWPR Report].
8
See Marlies Glasius, How Activists Shaped the Court, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: AN END TO IMPUNITY? (Crimes of War Project), Dec. 2003,
available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-glasius.html (describing importance of non-governmental organizations in negotiations at Rome,
including efforts by NGO coalitions formed to advocate on behalf of victims).
9
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, art. 68(3), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status
and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1387, 1388 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Jorda and de Hemptinne](stating that the Rome Statute “appears to mark a new step forward . . . victims are accorded the double status denied to them by the provisions setting up the ad hoc Tribunals. First they are
able to take part in the criminal process . . . . Secondly, they are entitled to seek
form the Court reparations . . . .”).
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nized that victims had a unique “voice” to raise in proceedings, and
that any justice obtained in the ICC should have the nature of restoring dignity to victims in addition to seeking retribution.10 Victims therefore obtained, in the text of the Rome Statute, the right to
“express views and concerns,” through a legal representative, at
proceedings at which their personal interests are affected.11
The consensus in favor of granting victims, quite literally, a
“place at the table” in ICC proceedings, predictably was tempered
by a view—equally widely considered and shared—that victims’
participation should not occur to a degree or in a manner that
would undermine the core ICC mission of trying perpetrators of
mass crimes. As one participant in the negotiations put it, “[i]t was
considered absolutely necessary to devise a realistic system that
would give satisfaction to those who had suffered harm without
jeopardizing the ability of the Court to proceed against those who
had committed the crimes.”12 The concern to protect the Court’s
ability to function effectively in adjudicating cases recognized that
victims share with other affected parties the strong interest that the
ICC succeed in prosecuting cases and reaching judgments.13
Drafters of the Rome Statute also logically had apprehensions that
greater victims’ participation would undermine the rights of the
defense 14 or upset the balance of roles between the prosecution and
the defense.15
10

See WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 8-11, 16-18, and sources cited therein.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68(3) (stating in pertinent part, “Such views
and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where
the Court considers it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence”).
12
See Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, Definition of Victims and General
Principle, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 427, 429 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter Fernández de Gurmendi].
13
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COMMENTARY TO THE SECOND
PREPARATORY COMMISSION MEETING ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, § 2 (1999) (“The interests of justice and the interests of victims are
complementary. The overriding interest of victims is likely to be the interest in
seeing that crimes are effectively investigated and that justice is done.”).
14
See, e.g., Gilbert Bitti & Håkan Friman, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 456, 457 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bitti and Friman] (“some delegations were also uncertain what impact such
an individual role would have on the rights of the accused”).
15
See, e.g., Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1399 (“It is not a simple
matter, however, to allow a third protagonist to play an active role in the adversarial proceedings. Since such proceedings are based on an already delicate
11
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The right of participation granted in the Rome Statute
therefore was both unprecedented yet consciously bounded. Victims obtained the status of “participants,” but not “parties.”16 The
RPE specified that at trials, for example, victims could be restricted to written submissions made by their legal representatives
and would be permitted to question witnesses or experts or defendants, again through their representatives, only after submitting
proposals to the Chamber and obtaining Chamber approval.17 Victims were curbed from obtaining forms of participation that they
enjoyed as parties civiles in certain civil law systems.18 For example, they could not initiate prosecutions or compel the bringing of
criminal cases, nor could they routinely obtain the evidence of the
Prosecution or defense or call witnesses.19
¶11
As happened with many of the thorny issues discussed
during negotiations at Rome, the task of more precisely defining
the right of victims’ participation, and balancing that right with
objectives of fairness and efficiency, was deferred for the consideration of the judges who would later be appointed. Article 68(3)
of the Rome Statute, the sub-section granting the right of victims’
participation, provides, in pertinent part:

equilibrium between two parties, there is a real danger that, unless the rights of
victims are accompanied by the conferment on the judge of effective powers of
control, the rights of the accused may be prejudiced and the trials considerably
delayed.”).
16
In the terminology of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the
Prosecution and Defense are referred to as “parties” and participating victims as
“participants.”
17
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, ICCASP/1/3(2002), R. 91(2) & (3) [hereinafter RPE].
18
In some civil law systems, a victim may act as a partie civile, a claimant authorized to pursue civil damages as part of the criminal case. See, e.g., Marion
E. I. Brienen & Ernestine H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime, 22 EUR. CRIM. JUST.
SYS. 27 (2000). The authority of victims in certain civil law jurisdictions can
extend to requesting investigative steps, initiating cases against alleged perpetrators, questioning witnesses, and presenting evidence. See id. at 27-29.
19
See Bitti and Friman, supra note 14, at 457 n.67 (“Contrary to what is the
case in, for example, French and Swedish municipal systems, victims do not
have the right under the Rome Statute to initiate the criminal proceedings.”);
Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1406 (“a victim does not enjoy the
same rights as the other parties to the proceedings. He may not participate in the
investigation undertaken by the Prosecutor, have access to the evidence gathered
by the parties, nor call witnesses to testify at the hearing. Furthermore, he has
no right of appeal . . . .).
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Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair
and impartial trial.20
¶12

The governing documents of the ICC—the Rome Statute and
the RPE—offer concrete directives about victims’ participation at
certain proceedings, such as proceedings relating to jurisdiction
and admissibility questions,21 confirmation hearings,22 and trials.23
The text of Art. 68(3), however, ensures that the ICC judges will
determine the scope of victims’ participation, because it leaves
“personal interests” undefined and calls upon the judiciary to decide the appropriateness of participation at different stages of the
proceeding.
B. The January 17, 2006 Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I in the
DRC Situation

¶13

Against this backdrop, the decision taken on January 17,
2006 by Pre-Trial Chamber I, to grant victims a general right to
participate in proceedings during the investigation of a “situation,”24 was accurately seen to be a watershed decision of the
fledgling Court. The first interpretation of Article 68(3) came in

20

Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68(3).
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 19(3) (“In proceedings with respect to
jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred the situation under article
13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the Court.”); RPE, supra
note 17, R. 59(1)(b) (directing the Registrar to inform victims who have communicated with the Court, when there is any question or challenge of jurisdiction or admissibility).
22
See RPE, supra note 17, R. 92(3) (“In order to allow victims to apply for participation . . . the Court shall notify victims regarding its decision to hold a hearing to confirm charges . . . .”).
23
See RPE, supra note 17, R. 91(2) and 91(3)(a) & (b) (providing that legal representatives of victims who attend and participate at trial may be limited to written observations or submissions and may seek authorization to question witnesses and the accused).
24
In the terminology of the Rome Statute, the subject matter of an investigation
is a “situation,” see, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 13, and thus the two
terms are synonymous.
21
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the context of the DRC investigation, before the commencement of
any ICC case or the naming of any defendant.
¶14
Pre-Trial Chamber I, led at the time by the Honorable Claude
Jorda, expanded the victim’s participation right: (1) beyond any
definition foreseen or advocated by any commentator on the Rome
Statute;25 and (2) by the Chamber’s own description, beyond any
right required by the Statute’s text. The ruling of Pre-Trial Chamber I was that participation by victims in the investigation was warranted because “victims are affected in general at the investigation
stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can serve to
clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators of crimes and to request
reparations for the harm suffered.”26 The Chamber carefully disclaimed that Article 68(3) required that victims be permitted to
participate during the investigation; it found instead that the provision “does not necessarily exclude the stage of investigation of a
situation.”27 The Chamber found that the textual ellipsis was best
treated by granting a general right of victims to participate in the
investigation, because this broader participation was “consistent
with the object and purpose of the victims participation regime established by the drafters of the Statue [sic] . . . .”28 In particular,
the Chamber noted that the ICC had been created as a result of “a
debate that took place in the context of a growing emphasis placed
on the role of victims by the international body of human rights
law and by international humanitarian law.”29 The Chamber found
persuasive a trend it saw in cases from the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to
grant victims the right to participate in proceedings during the investigation stage, “to have the facts clarified and the perpetrators
prosecuted,” particularly when “the outcome of criminal proceed-

25

Claude Jorda himself had commented, before being appointed a judge of the
ICC, that victims “may not participate in the investigation undertaken by the
Prosecutor. . . .” Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1406.
26
Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3,
VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Public Redacted Version, ¶ 63 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter 17 January 2006 DRC Decision] (emphasis added).
27
Id. ¶ 38.
28
Id. ¶ 50.
29
Id.
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ings is of decisive importance for obtaining reparations for the
harm suffered.”30
¶15
The decision anticipated victims’ participation in a variety of
investigation-phase proceedings. The decision ruled that victims
might “be heard by the Chamber in order to present their views and
concerns and to file documents pertaining to the current investigation of the situation in the DRC.”31 The decision opined that victims could potentially participate in proceedings relating to the
protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence, and in other proceedings initiated by the Prosecution or defense.32 Pre-Trial Chamber I granted to victims vis-à-vis the investigation or situation the right to seek “specific measures,” without
further defining what those measures might be.33
¶16
Pre-Trial Chamber I interpreted in a narrow fashion its
obligation under Article 68(3) to disallow victims’ participation
that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused or to a fair and impartial trial. The Pre-Trial Chamber disclaimed any need to consider
whether the general right to participate in the investigation phase
itself implicated or impaired fairness, efficiency, or the rights of
the defense.34 This was because, in the Chamber’s view, victims’
participation during the investigation phase “does not per se jeopardise the appearance of integrity and objectivity of the investigation, nor is it inherently inconsistent with basic considerations of
efficiency and security.”35 The Chamber determined that any
prejudice to the defense or to fairness or efficiency could instead
be regulated by determining, on a case-by-case basis, the appropriate “modalities,” or methods of participation, when victims sought
to intervene in particular investigation-stage proceedings.36
¶17
The result of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s ruling was to grant to six
applicants what it termed “the status of victim,” or the general right
to participate during the DRC investigation phase, in the absence
of any request to participate in any particular investigation-phase
proceeding, and before any case in the DRC investigation had

30

See id. ¶¶ 50-53, 63.
Id. ¶ 71.
32
See id. ¶¶ 73-74.
33
See id. at 42.
34
See id. ¶ 57.
35
Id.
36
See id. ¶¶ 57, 70.
31
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commenced.37 Given the circumstance that the DRC investigation
extended to all crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction which might
have been committed within the territory of the DRC since July 1,
2002, the Chamber granted the right to participate based on reasoning that the six applicants established “grounds to believe” that
they had suffered harm resulting from some crime within the ICC’s
jurisdiction (i.e., genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity) and committed somewhere in the DRC since July 1, 2002.38
The Chamber reasoned that the burden of proof of “grounds to believe” was appropriate because that same low standard triggered
another right during the investigation phase.39 Specifically, a witness’ entitlement to be warned about the right against selfincrimination, and to counsel, under Article 55(2), applies when
the Prosecutor finds “grounds to believe” that the witness has
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.40
¶18
After the first case of the DRC investigation commenced,
with the arrest of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in March 2006, Pre-Trial
Chamber I invited views on whether the same six applicants should
be granted the right to participate in the Lubanga case.41 The
Chamber ruled, after hearing from the parties and the applicants’
representative, that to qualify to participate in the case, the applicants would have to meet the much more stringent standard of
demonstrating “that a sufficient causal link exists between the
harm they suffered and the crimes . . . for which the Chamber has
issued an arrest warrant.”42 The six applicants failed to qualify to
participate in the case, and thus it became clear that they were not
victims of the specific crimes with which Lubanga was charged:
child conscription, child enlistment or use of children in hostilities.
¶19
By the time Lubanga’s confirmation hearing was held, in
November 2006, four other victims of the DRC conflict had obtained the “status of victim” in the Lubanga case.43 These appli37

See id. at 41.
See id. ¶¶ 94, 98, 102-86.
39
See id. ¶ 98.
40
See id.
41
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-172tEN, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
Public Redacted Version, 2-3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, June 29, 2006) [hereinafter
DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6].
42
See id. at 6.
43
Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-177-tENG, Decision on the
38
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cants qualified for participation in the case because they established that their sons had been conscripted or enlisted by
Lubanga’s armed group, the Union des Patriotes Congolaises
(“UPC”) during late 2002 or early 2003, the time periods at issue
in Lubanga’s arrest warrant.44 The four victims, whose applications had been culled from over seventy applications to participate
in the case considered by Pre-Trial Chamber I,45 expressed views
and concerns through representatives in Lubanga’s confirmation
hearing, held in late 2006.46

Applications for Participation in the Proceedings a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and
a/0003/06 in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the
investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Public, 10, 12, 13, 16
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, July 31, 2006) [hereinafter 31 July 2006 Lubanga Case
Decision] (admitting three applicants to participate in Lubanga case and DRC
situation); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06601-tEN, Decision on Applications for Participation in Proceedings a/0004/06 to
a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06, and a/0105/06 in the
case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Public, 12-13 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision] (admitting one applicant to participate in Lubanga case).
44
See 31 July 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 8-13, 16; 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 11-12, 13. The applicants
were held to the standard of establishing “reasonable grounds to believe” victimization resulted from a crime charged in the arrest warrant. See 31 July 2006
Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 9; 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case
Decision, supra note 43, at 12. This standard for participation in case proceedings had been adopted in the DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 to
VPRS 6, supra note 41, at 6, presumably based on reasoning that the applicants
should meet the same burden the Prosecutor had satisfied obtaining the arrest
warrant that had commenced the case. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art.
58(1)(a) (providing that warrant issuance will be conditioned upon finding of
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the person whose arrest or appearance is
sought has committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court).
45
See DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, supra note
41, at 8-9 (denying participation to six applicants); 31 July 2006 Lubanga Case
Decision, supra note 43, at 16 (granting participation to three applicants); 20
October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13 (granting participation to one of sixty-five applications considered).
46
See 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13; Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Public Redacted Version with Annex I, ¶¶ 30-31 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Jan. 29, 2007) (specifying dates of hearing and submissions of victims’ representatives).
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C. The Subsequent Decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers in the
Northern Uganda and Darfur Situations
¶20

In subsequent decisions, judges of the Pre-Trial Chambers
sitting in the investigations in northern Uganda and in Darfur
joined the view that it was appropriate to grant a general right to
participate in investigations. These decisions stated more explicitly that the participation right remained hypothetical, pending a
separate determination of the propriety of participation in a specific proceeding. The Chambers also defined victim participation
standards differently than the January 17, 2006 decision of PreTrial Chamber I.
¶21
The decision in the Uganda situation was issued on August
10, 2007, more than a year and a half after Pre-Trial Chamber I’s
decision.47 By that time, five arrest warrants in the case Prosecutor
v. Joseph Kony had been made public, in October 2005,48 but no
defendant had been arrested.
¶22
The Single Judge assigned by Pre-Trial Chamber II to
manage victims’ issues49 in the Uganda situation affirmed the
“broad approach” of granting a general right of victims to participate in the investigation phase.50 The August 10, 2007 decision
was made in the context of deciding forty-nine applications, submitted from June to November 2006, by individuals seeking to participate in the Uganda investigation and the Kony case.51 Like PreTrial Chamber I, the Single Judge determined that participation at
the investigation stage was not required by the Rome Statute, but
instead “was not excluded from” the scope of Article 68(3)52 and
remained “consistent with” the object and purpose of the Rome
47

Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-101, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to
1/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Public Redacted Version (Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision].
48
ICC Press Release, Warrants of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders, ICC-20051014-110-EN (Oct. 14, 2005) available at http://www.icccpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=114&l=ehtml [hereinafter ICC Press Release re
Uganda Warrants].
49
See 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47. A judge acts as Single
Judge pursuant to appointment of the Chamber, see id. at 2, and thus his or her
decision is equal to that of the Chamber itself. The 10 August 2007 Uganda
Decision was rendered by Judge Mauro Politi.
50
See id. ¶ 83.
51
See id. at 2-3 & ¶ 2.
52
Id. ¶ 7.
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Statute.53 While agreeing on the existence of the general right,
however, the Single Judge believed it “critical to ensuring the predictability of proceedings and ultimately the certainty and effectiveness of victims’ participation” to “specify[] the nature and
scope of the proceedings in which victims may participate in the
context of a situation, prior to, and/or irrespective of, a case . . . .”54
The decision thus undertook to provide a non-exhaustive list of
proceedings in which victims might expect to participate. 55 Some
of the proceedings on the list, however, were ones in which victims
could have expected to participate in any event, because the Rome
Statute specifies them as proceedings in which victims’ views must
be sought.56 The Single Judge proposed new possibilities of victim
participation, for example, in proceedings relating to protective
measures for victims or the preservation of evidence, even “when
it would still be unknown whether the evidence to be preserved
refers to an incident which will be the subject of a warrant of arrest
or summons to appear.”57
¶23
The decision in the northern Uganda situation committed the
Chambers to undertake two separate case-by-case inquiries in relation to any application to participate in the investigation: first, to
determine whether the “status of victim” could be granted vis-à-vis
an investigation, and second, to determine whether that “victim”
may participate in any given investigation-phase proceeding without impairing fairness or efficiency.58 This aspect of the Single
Judge’s decision was consistent with the January 17, 2006 decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I, which had also deferred fairness and efficiency considerations. The Single Judge’s decision, however,
added a requirement to the second step of the inquiry by holding
that even an applicant granted the theoretical right to participate in
53

Id. ¶ 7 (quoting 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 50).
Id. ¶ 88.
55
See id.
56
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 90-95 (discussing right of victims under Arts. 15, 19, and Rule
92(2) to be heard when Prosecutor commences investigation proprio motu,
when questions relating to jurisdiction or admissibility are raised, or when the
Prosecutor determines not to investigate or prosecute based on interests of justice concerns under Art. 53).
57
See id. ¶¶ 96-101.
58
See id. ¶ 83 (stating that the “only requirement” for granting the status of victim “would be that applicant victims claim to have suffered harm as a consequence of events allegedly qualifying as crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court that, while encompassed in the scope of the situation, are not, or are yet to
be, the subject matter of a case.”).
54
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investigation-phase proceedings, based on the general interests of
victims in investigations, would additionally “need to indicate how
[his or her] ‘personal interests’ could be affected in relation to proceedings in which [he or she] may participate, despite the fact that
no case . . . is (as yet) under judicial scrutiny.”59 The Single Judge
thus found that whether the Chamber would grant victim participation in a specific investigation-stage proceeding would depend,
“not only upon the nature and scope of the proceeding, but also
upon the personal circumstances of the victim in question,” as well
as potential effects on fairness and efficiency.60
¶24
This legal rule, which was not further explained, appeared to
echo, without citing, a prior ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the
Lubanga case. In a decision dated June 13, 2007, the Appeals
Chamber had decided that the four victims participating in the
Lubanga case would not be permitted to submit views and concerns on the question of whether the Appeals Chamber would grant
the defense an appeal from the Pre-Trial Chamber decision confirming the charges against Lubanga.61 The Appeals Chamber had
found that the victims had failed to demonstrate an effect on their
personal interests, despite their claims: (1) that the appeal affected
whether the case would proceed against Lubanga; and (2) that their
participation in the confirmation hearing itself rendered it impossible that they could not participate in an appeal arising from that
hearing.62 The Appeals Chamber held that “whether the personal
interests of victims are affected in relation to a particular appeal
will require careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.”63 The
Appeals Chamber also had noted that victims would be held to
demonstrate, in particular, that the interests they assert do not “belong instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor.”64
¶25
The Single Judge in the Uganda situation approached the
applicant’s burden of proof in the same manner as Pre-Trial
Chamber I, but did not agree on the terminology of “grounds to
59

Id. ¶ 89.
See id. ¶¶ 89, 103.
61
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-925, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the “Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber” of 2 February 2007, Public, ¶ 29 (June 13, 2007).
62
See id. ¶¶ 10-11.
63
Id. ¶ 28.
64
Id.
60

474

ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW

[Vo l. 6

believe.”65 Rather, the Single Judge characterized the test as one
requiring “intrinsic coherence” of the applicant’s claim to have
suffered from a crime within the scope of the ICC investigation.66
The Single Judge also took up a matter not addressed in detail in
the Pre-Trial Chamber I decision: the forms of identification sufficient to prove an applicant’s identity. The Single Judge determined that applicants could not qualify for participation, “in principle,” without first submitting proof of identity issued by a “recognized public authority.”67 Using this rule, the Single Judge deferred decisions on applications supported by less formal forms of
proof of identity.68
¶26
The Single Judge found, upon applying the legal standards
announced in his decision, that only two of the forty-nine applicants had properly established a claim to have suffered harm as a
result of crimes committed since July 1, 2002 in northern Uganda,
and thus should be granted the “status of victim” vis-a-vis the investigation.69 The Single Judge also determined that six of the
forty-nine applicants should be granted the “status of victim” in the
Kony case.70 In making determinations about eligibility to participate in the case, the Single Judge applied the same test as had PreTrial Chamber I. Thus, the six successful applicants had demonstrated that they had suffered from one of the crimes charged in the
warrants of arrest in the case.71 In the Kony case, five leaders of
the Lord’s Resistance Army, an armed rebel group, had been
charged in thirty-three counts for their role in six of the hundreds
65

10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶ 15.
See id. The Single Judge imposed the additional requirement that applicants to
participate in the situation must establish “to a high degree of probability the
occurrence of incidents related by the applicants, both in temporal and territorial
terms.” Id. ¶ 106. The requirement could be satisfied, in the Single Judge’s view,
by the submission of information from the applicant or the Registry that the incidents during which the applicants claimed to have suffered harm in fact occurred. See id.
67
See id. ¶ 16.
68
See id. ¶¶ 109-11. The decision of the Single Judge directed the Victims’ Participation and Reparations Section (“VPRS”) to inform the applicants whose
petitions had been deferred of the deficiencies in their applications. See id. at 61.
69
See id. at 61. One of the case victims was also admitted as a situation victim.
See id.
70
See id.
71
See id. ¶¶ 9, 10 (describing necessity that victim have been involved in crime
charged) & 30, 39, 49, 59, 66, 75 (granting participation in case to applicants
who related having been victimized as a result of “incidents . . . included in the
warrants of arrest issued in the Case”).
66
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of attacks allegedly carried out in northern Uganda after July 1,
2002.72
¶27
The Single Judge deferred consideration of the vast majority
of the applications—forty-two in total—pending submission of
additional information by the applicants and/or the Registry.73 In
March 2008, seven months after his first decision, the Single Judge
revisited the deferred applications, following the submission of
further information by the Registry.74 The result of this evaluation
was the adjudication of another fifteen of the original forty-nine
applications, based on the Single Judge’s decision to “lower” the
requirements for forms of identification which would be deemed
reliable, in light of “the factual circumstances in the region” such
as widespread reliance on non-official forms of identification.75
¶28
The Pre-Trial Chamber assigned to the Darfur situation
issued on December 3, 2007 its first decision regarding standards it
would apply in deciding applications to participate.76 The Chamber was Pre-Trial Chamber I, but of a different membership because of the intervening retirement of Judge Jorda.77 In the Darfur
72

ICC Press Release re Uganda Warrants, supra note 48.
10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 62.
74
Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-125, Decision on Victims’ Application for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06,
a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06,
a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06,
a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06, Public Redacted Version
(Pre-Trial Chamber II, Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Second Decision re Uganda
Participation].
75
See id. at 70-71 & ¶¶ 4, 6. The Second Decision re Uganda Participation has
been appealed by ad hoc defense counsel. See Situation in Uganda, Situation
No. ICC-02/04-128-tENG, Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation Issued on 14 March 2008, Public
(Pre-Trial Chamber II, Mar. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Defense Request for Leave to
Appeal Second Decision re Uganda Participation] (challenging existence of
general right to participate in the investigation). The OTP has stated that it does
not oppose the application. See Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04128, Prosecution’s Response to Defence’s Request for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge’s 14 March 2008 Decision on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings, Public, ¶ 10 (Mar. 31, 2008).
76
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-110, Decision on the
Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the
Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 3 December 2007 Darfur Decision on OPCD
Requests for Addt’l and Exculpatory Information].
77
The Chamber was then composed of Judge Akua Kuenyehia, Judge Anita
Ušacka, and Judge Sylvia Steiner. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No.
73
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situation, the case Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun had commenced,
but again, no defendants were in custody, and therefore the Office
of Public Counsel for the Defense (“OPCD”), a unit of the Registry, had been authorized to file observations regarding victims’ applications on behalf of future defendants.78 In relation to some of
the first applications to participate in the Darfur situation and case,
the OPCD filed requests that the applicants and the Office of the
Prosecutor (“OTP”) be required to provide information that might
tend to undermine the credibility of the allegations of the applicants.79 The Single Judge charged with managing victim-related
matters denied these requests in the December 3, 2007 decision
and, in the course of doing so, affirmed that “there is a procedural
status of victim in relation to situation and case proceedings before
the Pre-Trial Chamber.”80 The Single Judge affirmed, without extended discussion, that she would follow the ruling of Pre-Trial
Chamber I in deeming the stage of investigation of a situation to be
an appropriate stage for victim participation.81
¶29
Three days later, the Single Judge issued a decision in which
she granted “the procedural status of victim,” vis-à-vis the investigation, to eleven applicants.82 A total of twenty-one applications
ICC-02/05-83, Decision Replacing a Judge in Pre-Trial Chamber I, Public
(Presidency, June 22, 2007).
78
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-74, Decision Authorising the Filing of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 23, 2007).
79
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-95, Public Redacted
Version of Request for the Single Judge to Order the Production of Relevant
Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Rule 86(2)(e), Public (Aug. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter OPCD Darfur Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants];
Situation in the Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-97, Request for the
Single Judge to Order the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Materials, Public
(Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter OPCD Darfur Request for Exculpatory Materials].
80
See 3 December 2007 Darfur Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and
Exculpatory Information, supra note 76, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). The Single
Judge was Judge Akua Kuenyehia.
81
See id. The OPCD later argued that the lack of reasoning was itself a ground
of appeal, and that the Single Judge appeared wrongly to have believed that the
17 January 2006 DRC Decision was binding in the Darfur situation. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-113, Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of
Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and
a/0035/07 to a/0038/07,” Public, ¶ 15 & n.9 (Dec. 12, 2007).
82
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-111-Corr, Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to 1/015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and
a/0035/07 to a/0038/07, Public, 3-5, 22-23 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 14, 2007)
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had been submitted to the Court between June 2006 and July 2007,
and each applicant had sought to participate in the situation and
case.83 The Single Judge deferred consideration of the applicants’
requests to participate in the case.84 The eleven applicants that obtained the “status of victim” vis-à-vis the investigation were
deemed to have established “grounds to believe” that they suffered
harm from crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and committed in Darfur.85 The Single Judge denied ten applicants the right to
participate in the investigation, on grounds, for example, that two
applicants were deceased, and that other applicants had not presented adequate proof of relation to the victims on whose behalf
they claimed to act.86 Two of the ten applicants denied the right to
participate were invited to submit missing or supplementary information.87 The Single Judge gave notice of the proofs of identity
that would be deemed acceptable in the Darfur situation.88
¶30
The Single Judge’s decision in the Darfur situation adopted
the framework of the “two-stage qualification system” envisioned
by the Pre-Trial Chamber in its January 17, 2006 decision in the
DRC situation. Thus, she emphasized that even applicants granted
the procedural “status of victim” would need to demonstrate, in
relation to any future proceeding in which they might seek to participate, that participation could occur “in a manner which is not
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.”89 The
Single Judge, however, rejected the views of the Appeals Chamber
and the Single Judge in the Uganda situation that effect on “personal interests” of victims must be re-assessed in the context of the
particular proceeding in which a victim sought to participate. Instead, the December 6, 2007 decision stated that “the assessment of
[hereinafter 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision]. The decision was re-issued by
means of the Corrigendum, dated 14 December 2007, which does not acknowledge that the original decision was issued on December 6, 2007.
83
See id. at 3-5 & ¶ 8.
84
See id. ¶ 8 (“The Single Judge also notes that although all of the Applicants
have requested to participate in all stages of proceedings, she will, at this stage,
only examine whether the Applicants fulfil [sic] the criteria to be granted the
procedural status of victims at the investigation stage of the Situation in Darfur,
Sudan . . . .”) (citation omitted).
85
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 45-47.
86
See id. at 23 & ¶¶ 33, 35, 36.
87
See id. ¶¶ 31, 33 & at 23.
88
See id. ¶ 28.
89
See id. ¶ 14.
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the personal interests of the victims . . . is only to be conducted for
the determination of the specific set of procedural rights attached
to the procedural status of victim.”90
D. The January 18, 2008 Trial Chamber Decision Regarding
Participation in the Lubanga Trial
¶31

Just after each of the Pre-Trial Chambers in the DRC,
northern Uganda and Darfur situations had completed furnishing
their decisions, the first active Trial Chamber, sitting on the
Lubanga case, issued a “Decision on Victims’ Participation,” dated
January 18, 2008.91 The decision of Trial Chamber I knocked
away one of the linchpins of the existing jurisprudence on victims’
participation, by rejecting sua sponte the prior rulings of Pre-Trial
Chamber I in the DRC situation and of the Single Judge in the
Uganda situation that the status of victim, insofar as a case was
concerned, should only be granted to victims of the crimes charged
in arrest warrants.92
¶32
The majority opinion, joined by the Honorable Adrian
Fulford and Honorable Elizabeth Odio Benito, stated the intention
to “provide the parties and participants with general guidelines on
all matters related to the participation of victims throughout the
proceedings.”93 As of the date of the Trial Chamber decision, there
were still only four victims to whom the Chamber had granted the
right to participate in any proceeding in the Lubanga case, despite
the pendency of scores of applications to participate in the case,
some filed as early as the fall of 2006,94 and the approaching trial
date of March 31, 2008.95 The majority opinion did not discuss, or
90

Id. ¶ 13.
See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3.
92
Compare id. ¶¶ 93-95 with, e.g., DRC Decision on Case Participation of
VPRS 1 to VPRS, supra note 41, at 6 (“at the case stage, the Applicants must
demonstrate that a sufficient causal link exists between the harm they have suffered and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo bears criminal responsibility and for which the Chamber
has issued an arrest warrant”); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47,
¶¶ 9, 30, 39, 49, 59, 66, 75 (applying standard of requiring applicant to have
suffered harm from crimes which “appear to be included in the warrants of arrest issued in the Case”).
93
See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶ 84.
94
See id. at 1 (referencing as participants Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and
a/0105/06); discussion infra in Part III.A (relating to number of pending applications).
95
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1019,
91
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even cite, any of the prior decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers in
which those Chambers had ruled that the status of victim vis-à-vis
a case would be limited to applicants who alleged harm resulting
from the charges prosecuted in the Court. The majority held that
an applicant would be entitled to “potentially participate” in a
case—i.e., obtain an entitlement analogous to the right the PreTrial Chambers had called the “status of victim”—if he or she was
“a victim of any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the
Court.”96 This ruling lowered the standard for granting the “status
of victim” vis-à-vis a case, at a minimum, to the standard which
until then had been applied to grant the “status of victim” vis-à-vis
a situation.97
¶33
The majority reasoned that Rule 85(a) of the RPE, which
defined the term “victims” for the purposes of the Statute and the
RPE, provided that “victims” were “natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.”98 The majority opined that because there
was no further requirement set forth in Rule 85(a) that the harm to
the victim must have resulted from the crimes prosecuted in the
ICC, no such limitation could lawfully be imposed.99 The majority
also found support for its broad definition of “victim” in Principles
8 and 9 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005
Decision Regarding the Timing and Manner of Disclosure and the Date of Trial,
Public, ¶ 29 (Trial Chamber I, Nov. 9, 2007).
96
See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶ 95 (emphasis
added).
97
The standard may even be lower than that used by the Pre-Trial Chambers to
grant the “status of victim” and “procedural status of victim” to applicants to
participate in the investigation, because the majority opinion does not limit the
potential participation to applicants who allege crimes within the same situation.
See J. Blattman Dissent to Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note
4, ¶ 9 (“in the Majority opinion there seems to be a re-categorisation of victims
who are related neither to the situation nor to the case”). As is described infra in
notes 102-05 and in the accompanying text, the second inquiry envisioned by
the majority opinion is to determine if there is a “real evidential link” between
the victim and the evidence the Court will be considering at trial. It is not inconceivable that a victim of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and
committed in Uganda, for example, could have evidence or information relating
to the Lubanga trial.
98
See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶ 93.
99
See id.

480

ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW

[Vo l. 6

(“Basic Victims’ Principles”).100 Those Principles provided that
victims were persons “who individually or collectively suffered
harm . . . through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations
of international human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law,” without regard to “whether the perpetrator of the violation is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted . . . .”101
¶34
While substantially removing boundaries from the “status of
victim” in a case, the majority stated that actual participation at
trial would be limited by imposing a requirement that an applicant
demonstrate credible grounds to infer either: (1) a “real evidential
link” between the evidence considered by the Chamber during
Lubanga’s trial and himself or herself; and (2) that his or her personal interests would otherwise be affected because those interests
“are in a real sense engaged” by “an issue arising” during the
trial.102 In requiring applicants to demonstrate, in a second step,
links between their proposed participation and the evidence and
issues likely to arise at trial, the reasoning of the majority openly
favored applicants who would also qualify as witnesses. The majority indeed ruled that “the right to introduce evidence during trials before the Court is not limited to the parties,”103 and gave as
examples of victims who would be permitted to participate at trial
those who were “involve[d] in or presen[t] at a particular incident
which the Chamber is considering,” or who “suffered identifiable
harm” from such an incident.104 The Chamber declared it “critical
to emphasise and repeat that for victims to participate in this trial
these interests must relate to the evidence and the issues the
Chamber will be considering in its investigation of the charges
brought against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo . . . .”105
¶35
The Trial Chamber’s majority opinion triggered the separate
and dissenting opinion of Judge Blattman referenced in the Introduction above. Judge Blattman noted that he harbored “grave con100

See id. ¶¶ 35, 92.
See id. ¶ 35 (quoting Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Principles 8 & 9 (Dec. 16, 2005)).
102
See id. ¶ 95.
103
Id. ¶ 108.
104
Id. ¶ 96.
105
See id. ¶ 97 (emphasis added).
101
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cerns with some fundamental premises within the decision.”106 He
questioned, in particular, the standard chosen by the majority for
granting the “status of victim,”107 a standard he found to be without
foundation “in any national legislation or jurisprudence.”108 Judge
Blattman opined that the majority was mistaken in failing to read
the text of Rule 85 within the context of the implicit but absolute
limitation of the Court’s competency, or jurisdiction.109 In Judge
Blattman’s view, “the Trial Chamber has the competency to determine whether a person is a victim only when linked to the facts
and circumstances found within the charges presented by the
prosecution and confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, and must
stay within this framework in its consideration of victims.”110 The
majority opinion’s reliance on the Basic Victims’ Principles “concerned” Judge Blattman, because “the particular provisions relied
on in the Majority decision were specifically considered and rejected during the preparatory stages of the drafting of the Rome
Statute.”111
¶36
In Judge Blattman’s opinion, failing to observe the parameters established by the confirmed charges compromised the rights
of the Accused, the fairness of the process, and equally the rights
of victims. An “over inclusive and imprecise” definition of victims, according to the dissenting opinion, made it “very difficult to
know who is actually a victim of the alleged crimes attributed to
the Accused,”112 a circumstance which in turn impaired the defendant’s due process rights in a way which “upset” the “important
balance” between the rights of victims to participate and “the absolute right of the Accused to a fair and impartial trial.”113 Judge
Blattman elaborated that neglecting to limit properly “the accusations that may be brought and . . . the actors that may intervene in
the proceedings . . . would bring about . . . the inappropriate sce106

See J. Blattman Dissent to Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra
note 4, ¶ 32.
107
Id. ¶ 21.
108
Id. ¶ 29.
109
Id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 21.
110
Id. ¶ 16.
111
Id. ¶ 4 (citing Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 12, at 428-29, and David
Donat-Cattin, Article 75: Reparations to Victims, in COMMENTARY TO THE
ROME STATUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 969 (Otto Triffterer
ed., 1999)).
112
Id. ¶ 10.
113
Id. ¶ 30.
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nario in which the Trial Chamber could be forced to make determinations based on evidence which is outside of the scope the
charges [sic] against the Accused.”114 Judge Blattman noted that
defining victims vaguely or preliminarily equally failed to
“provid[e] tangible benefits for victims . . . .”115 Additionally, elevating the entitlement of applicants who had “suffered harm not
linked to the charges in the present case” compromised “the rights
of those victims who do fulfill the criteria of victims.”116
¶37
The dissenting opinion pointed out that the majority ruling,
expanding the grant of the “status of victim” vis-à-vis a case, had
been rendered in the absence of any argument from the OTP, the
defense, or victims’ representatives in favor of the liberalized standard.117 Judge Blattman noted that both Pre-Trial Chambers I and
II “have required, in order to determine the status of victims, that a
causal link be found between the harm a victim applicant has suffered and the crimes that the accused has been charged with.”118
The Appeals Chamber also had “never overruled this important
causal link” in any of the interlocutory appeals it had heard.119
¶38
Finally, Judge Blattman noted his view that the framework
created by the majority opinion would tend “to cause delays and
legal insecurities,"120 and was “over burdensome” for victims.121
He stated that the framework adopted by the majority “appears to
be requiring two applications of victims”: one “to be recognized by
the Trial Chamber as a victim who may generally participate in the
proceedings,” and a second “to indicate at what specific stage in
the proceedings they may participate as victims.”122 The majority
opinion thus “adopt[ed] a system in which every application is to
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for every procedural action.”123 Rather than providing “a solution for modalities of par114

Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 10.
116
Id. ¶ 32.
117
See id. ¶ 28 (stating that none of the “submissions from the parties and participants [had] requested or argued for the position that victims’ status in a particular case would not be tied to whether the harm suffered is a result of the
charges confirmed against the Accused.”)
118
Id. ¶ 17.
119
Id.
120
Id. ¶ 31.
121
See id. ¶¶ 22, 32.
122
Id. ¶ 22.
123
Id. ¶ 31.
115
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ticipation,” the majority ruling, in Judge Blattman’s view, “instead
postpone[d] decisions for future determination.”124 The dissenting
Judge emphasized his belief that the Rome Statute rendered it
mandatory, not elective, to consider burdens and inefficiency when
determining “at what stage during the trial proceedings it is appropriate for victims to present any views or concerns,” since appropriateness depended on factors including the factor of judicial
economy.125
E. The Positions of the Parties
¶39

As the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers were assessing the first
applications to participate in ICC investigations and cases, both the
OTP and defense counsel assigned in the situations and cases had
been making observations and arguments, most notably under RPE
Rule 89(1), which entitles the parties to comment upon applications.126 The OTP and defense counsel had strongly opposed the
ruling that the Statute recognizes the granting of a “status of victim” or “procedural status of victim,” or a general right to participate, in ICC investigations.127 The OTP and defense counsel also
each disputed the notion that effects on fairness and efficiency are
irrelevant when determining when to grant a “status of victim,”
“procedural status of victim,” or a general or potential right to participate, and only should be considered when later determining the
modalities of participation.128 Indeed, by the time the Pre-Trial
Chambers assigned to the DRC and Darfur situations granted, in
essence, leave to appeal these issues, the OTP and defense counsel

124

Id.
See id. ¶ 25.
126
The rule provides, in pertinent part, “Subject to the provisions of the Statute,
in particular article 68, paragraph 1, the Registrar shall provide a copy of the
application to the Prosecutor and the defence, who shall be entitled to reply
within a time limit to be set by the Chamber. Subject to the provisions of subrule 2, the Chamber shall then specify the proceedings and manner in which
participation is considered appropriate . . . .” See RPE, supra note 17, R. 89(1).
127
See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the OTP
position that there is no general right to participate in the investigation and infra
note 154 and accompanying text for a discussion of the position of Lubanga’s
pre-trial counsel that victim participation is improper even at the pre-trial stage.
128
See infra note 139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the OTP position and infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the position of Lubanga’s pre-trial counsel.
125
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had previously filed unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal.129
¶40
From its first submissions on the issue to Pre-Trial Chamber
I in 2005, the OTP contested the legality of granting a general right
to victims to participate in the investigation or situation. The OTP
contended that whether an applicant’s “personal interests” were
“affected,” within the meaning of Article 68(3), could not be determined except in reference to a “proceeding,” which in turn
could not be equated with the “investigation.”130 The OTP argued,
for example, that because Article 68(3) was clearly meant to impose some limitation upon participation in ICC proceedings, the
provision could not be read to permit participation for victims of
any crime within the theoretical jurisdiction of the Court without
violating the principle of treaty interpretation requiring every treaty
provision to be given effect.131 The OTP took the view in its early
submissions that in the investigation phase, participation by vic129

See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Situation No. ICC
01/04-103, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber I’s
“Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1,
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6,” Public (Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal]; Situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-141, Prosecution’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March
2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Public (Apr. 24, 2006); Situation in
Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-103, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to
Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06,
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06,
Public (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter OTP’s 20 August 2007 Uganda Submission
re Leave to Appeal]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-272, Request for Leave to Appeal the “Décision sur les demandes
de participation à la procedure a/0001/06, a/0002/06, et a/0003/06 dans le cadre
de l’affaire Le Procureur v. Thomas Lubanga et de l’enquête en République démocratique du Congo,” Public (Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Defense 7 August
2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal].
130
See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC01/04-84-Conf, Prosecution’s Reply on the Applications for Participation 01/041/dp to 01/04-6/dp, Reclassified as Public, ¶¶ 11-17 (Aug. 15, 2005) [hereinafter
OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission] (arguing that there are no “proceedings” within the meaning of Article 68(3) during the investigation phase); Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-85, Prosecution’s Reply under Rule
89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 1/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06 in the Uganda
Situation, Public, ¶ 22 (Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter OTP’s 28 February 2007
Uganda Submission] (“the investigation of a situation is a phase which does not
form part of the concept of proceedings as defined in [Art. 68(3)]”).
131
See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 25;
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 29.
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tims was permissible, but only in the “proceedings” specifically
identified in the Rome Statute and the RPE, for example:




Through presentation of views when the OTP seeks
authorization to commence an investigation proprio
motu, under Article 15(3);
By being informed if the OTP decides not to investigate or prosecute (see Article 53; Rule 92(2)), and
being heard on that matter;
Through submission of observations when the OTP
seeks a ruling from the Court regarding a question
of jurisdiction or admissibility, under Article
19(3).132

The granting of a general right to participate in the investigation, in
the view of the OTP, wrongly made redundant these provisions in
the Statute and RPE specifying instances of victims’ participation
relating to the investigation.133
¶41
The OTP’s argument relied on the proposition that the clear
design of the Rome Statute was to increase or expand victims’ participation as investigations and cases advanced to the proceedings
in which participation was most vital to victims—trial and hearings
relating to reparations.134 During the earliest phase of investigation, victims thus were expressly granted rights to be heard only
regarding specific matters in which their interests were plainly “affected,” such as the commencing of an investigation proprio motu
or the declining of an investigation on interests-of-justice
grounds.135 To grant a general right to participate in the investiga132

See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 5, 54;
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 20.
133
See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 15;
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 27.
134
See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 11-22;
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 20-27; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-346, Prosecution’s Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0106/06 to a/0110/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0188/06, a/0199/06,
a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to
a/0250/06, Public Redacted Version, ¶¶ 13-14 (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter
OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission]; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 21-22.
135
See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 5, 54;
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 20.
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tion, by contrast, failed to acknowledge that providing ill-defined
participation during that early phase would undermine the independence of the Prosecutor, the objectivity of the investigation,
and the efficiency of the Court.136 It also created forms of participation that approached or surpassed the partie civile system rejected at Rome: for example, a victim’s ability during an investigation to submit to the judges factual material collected outside of the
prosecutor’s investigation and unrelated to any crimes actually being investigated.137 The granting of an open-ended participation
right during the investigation, in the OTP’s view, upended the rational plan of the Statute to focus the Court’s limited resources on
providing greater participation rights to victims who had suffered
from crimes specifically prosecuted at the ICC.138
¶42
The OTP also contended that Article 68(3) did not permit the
Chambers to decline to consider how granting a general right to
participate might affect the fairness and efficiency of proceedings,
and to rely instead on a sweeping judgment that such a right was
not per se at odds with fair and expeditious proceedings.139 Because of the breadth of the general right, ICC proceedings could be
debilitated, the OTP argued, by the need to adjudicate, in successive steps, the participation rights of the hundreds of thousands of
victims of the conflicts under investigation.140 Moreover, given the
extreme selectivity of cases actually commenced in the ICC, if the
136

See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶¶ 5, 13-19, 31; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission,
supra note 130, ¶¶ 32-33; OTP’s 20 August 2007 Uganda Submission re Leave
to Appeal supra note 129, ¶¶ 13-14.
137
See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶¶ 17, 21; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra
note 130, ¶ 38 n.60.
138
See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 18-22
(arguing that the drafting history of Article 68 demonstrates the intent to provide
greater participation in case proceedings); OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶ 5 (contending that 17 January
2006 DRC Decision wrongly granted participation “regardless of whether the
person demonstrates any connection to the actual focus of the investigation at
the time, or any future case” and thus opened the right to tens of thousands, or
hundreds of thousands of individuals in the DRC).
139
See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶ 22 (stating that it is “no satisfactory solution” for the Chamber to
“merely state[] that it must arrange for the victims to take part in a way that respects the rights of the defence . . . .”).
140
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 5, 31-33; OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission, supra note
134, ¶¶ 22-25.
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Chambers persisted in the dominant view that case participation
would only be conferred on victims who suffered from charged
crimes, only the smallest fraction of those who participated in an
investigation would ever qualify to participate in any ICC case.141
The OTP argued that it was unfair to victims, as well as damaging
for the Court, to raise false expectations by granting a general right
to participate that was highly unlikely to lead to any opportunity to
express views or concerns in ICC trials or to the receipt of reparations.142
¶43
Finally, the OTP maintained that permitting general
participation in the investigation, or the “procedural status of victim,” also undermined the fairness and integrity of ICC proceedings, in that:




The burden of processing the applications for participation, and managing the ensuing participation,
would not be offset by meaningful victims’ participation;143
It prejudiced the defense to grant to victims the ability to participate in investigations, and present facts
to the Chambers, without subjecting that participation to safeguards which apply to the OTP (such as
the obligation to investigate exonerating circumstances under Article 54(1)(a)), or to both parties
(such as duties of disclosure);144

141
See, e.g., Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-315, Prosecution’s
Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0004/06 to
a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06, a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and
a/0105/06, Public with Confidential, Ex parte Annex, ¶ 20 (Nov. 30, 2006);
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 12.
142
See, e.g., Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-315, Prosecution’s
Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0004/06 to
a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06, a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and
a/0105/06, Public with Confidential, Ex parte Annex, ¶ 20 (Nov. 30, 2006);
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 12.
143
See, e.g., OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶
12-14, 40; OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission, supra note 134, ¶¶ 12-14, 2224.
144
See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶¶ 10, 13-22; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra
note 130, ¶¶ 32-33, 38-39; OTP’s 20 August 2007 Uganda Submission re Leave
to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶¶ 13-14.
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It damaged the judges’ appearance of impartiality,
and ignored that the Statute conferred no authority
upon the judges to conduct investigation, to permit
the judges to rule upon the existence of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of victims
of those crimes, before any defendant is present or
the OTP has presented any evidence.145

After the Lubanga case commenced and applications to
participate in the situations and cases came under consideration,
defense counsel also strongly challenged the standards selected by
the judges for evaluating applications to participate. 146 In particular, the lawyers who have represented Lubanga, as well as the
OPCD, in representing future defendants in the Darfur and DRC
situations,147 have contended that: (1) the applications to partici145
See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶¶ 14, 16, 26-27; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission,
supra note 130, ¶¶ 35-37.
146
The first two times the “status of victim” was granted–in the 17 January 2006
DRC Decision and 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision–the Pre-Trial Chamber
had before it no argument that opposed the granting of a general right to participate in the investigation. The relevant filing by ad hoc counsel in the DRC case
is not public, but is referenced in the 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note
26, which notes that ad hoc defense counsel did not “challenge either the applicability of article 68(3) of the Statute to this stage of the investigation or the
possibility in legal terms of participation by the victims at this stage of the proceedings.” See id. ¶ 24. In the Uganda situation and case, from the public filing
of ad hoc defense counsel it appears that she believed that a public information
document issued in 2005 by the ICC, which stated that victims could participate
“from the earliest stages of the proceedings,” precluded “the Defence [from
submitting] arguments against victim participation at all stages in the proceedings.” See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-216-tEN, Defence observations on applications for participation in the proceedings
a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to
a/0127/06, Public, ¶¶ 43-46 (Mar. 5, 2007). The lack of opposition by these first
defense counsel, especially given the subsequent objections raised by counsel
for Lubanga and OPCD, see infra notes 147-78 and accompanying text, may
reflect the difficulty that ad hoc counsel often faces in representing abstract interests.
147
The OPCD was first appointed in the Darfur and DRC situations in May
2007 to represent the interests of defendants during the investigation by replying
to observations to participate. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No.
ICC-02/05-74, Decision Authorising the Filing of Observations on Applications
for Participation in the Proceedings a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, May 23, 2007); Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-329tEN, Decision Authorising the Filing of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 23, 2007)
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pate, and the accounts contained therein, prejudice defendants by
exposing the judges to “accusers” other than the OTP;148 (2) it is
extra-legal to grant the status of victim based on collective “effects” shared by all victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court;149 and (3) the process of evaluating applications is burdensome to the defense and delays proceedings and trials, which also
prejudices the defense.150
¶45
Lubanga’s pre-trial counsel, whose defense of Lubanga was
vigorous, was the first to argue that applicants seeking participation inevitably and wrongly served as other “accusers” of the defendant, in providing accounts of their victimization.151 Lubanga’s
pre-trial counsel argued that the prejudice was compounded because the names of applicants were withheld from the defense (a
practice routinely ordered at the ICC to maintain the security of the
applicants), meaning that applicants functioned as anonymous accusers.152 Lubanga’s counsel noted that many applicants had advanced accusations about the UPC, the group Lubanga had led, and
some recounted crimes like murder, rape, and torture, that were not
among the only charges in the case: child conscription, child
enlistment, and use of children in hostilities.153
[hereinafter 23 May 2007 DRC Decision Authorizing Observations].
148
See infra notes 151-53 & 162-65 and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-119, OPCD Appeal Brief on the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of
Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the
Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the
Prosecutor,” Public, ¶¶ 20-21 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD
Darfur Appeal Brief]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-901-tEN, Response to the Application by Victims a/0001/06,
a/0002/06, a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 for Authorization to Participate in the Appeal Proceedings Relating to the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Public, ¶¶ 23-25 (May 11, 2006) [hereinafter Defense 11 May 2006 Lubanga Response].
150
See infra notes 159-60 & 174 and accompanying text.
151
See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal,
supra note 129, ¶ 45. Counsel in the pre-trial stage was Jean Flamme. See id. at
1.
152
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 7, 36-47; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-386-tEN, Defence Submissions regarding the Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0004/06 to a/0052/06, Public,
¶¶ 1-4 (Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants a/0004/06 to a/0052/06].
153
See, e.g., Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants
a/0004/06 to a/0052/06, supra note 152, ¶¶ 73-77; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-585, Observations de la Défense sur les
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¶46

The position of Lubanga’s pre-trial counsel was that victim
participation during pre-trial proceedings should be disallowed and
participation commenced following the confirmation of charges.154
Counsel noted that applicants to participate were indiscriminately
seeking to participate equally in all phases of proceedings, rather
than making any attempt to show the effects of any proceeding on
“personal interests.”155 Also, in counsel’s estimation, it “put the
cart before the horse” to grant victim status while deferring any
evaluation of the impact on the defense and on efficiency until the
Chamber considered “modalities” of participation in specific proceedings.156 Counsel stated: “the Pre-Trial Chamber should not
conduct a purely theoretical and ‘in abstracto’ examination of the
issue of whether, generally speaking, it is appropriate to participate
in the pre-trial stage.”157 Lubanga’s counsel argued that it undermined the appearance of the impartiality of the Pre-Trial Chamber
and Lubanga’s right to the presumption of innocence for the
Chamber to find, before the confirmation of any charges, that certain applicants to participate had suffered harm as a result of the
crimes allegedly perpetrated by Lubanga.158
¶47
Lubanga’s counsel argued further that especially, but not
uniquely, in the circumstances Lubanga faced, participation at the
pre-trial stage could not be accomplished without “undue delay” of
the proceedings and infringement of Lubanga’s rights.159 Counsel
repeatedly complained before Lubanga’s confirmation hearing that
the burden of responding to applications to participate, and the

demandes de participation à la procédure a/0072/06 à a/0080/06 et a/0105/06,
Public, ¶¶ 21-27 (Oct. 18, 2006).
154
See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal,
supra note 129, ¶ 10; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-379, Defence Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner
of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06, Public, ¶¶ 22-26 (Sept. 4,
2006) [hereinafter Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants a/0001/06 to a/0003/06].
155
See Defense 11 May 2006 Lubanga Response, supra note 149, ¶¶ 23-25.
156
Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note
129, ¶ 49.
157
Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06, supra note 154, ¶ 25.
158
See, e.g., Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants
a/0004/06 to a/0052/06, supra note 152, ¶¶ 50-53.
159
See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal,
supra note 120, ¶¶ 50-53.
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“potentially detrimental” allegations raised therein, was impairing
the defense’s preparation for the hearing.160
¶48
The OPCD, while serving as ad hoc counsel to as-yet
theoretical defendants in the DRC and Darfur situations, made a
series of objections through which it finally obtained leave to challenge the notion, first expressed in the January 17, 2006 decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I, that there was nothing inherently unfair in
permitting the “procedural status of victim.”161 When the first applications to participate in the Darfur situation were under consideration, in June 2007, the OPCD contended that the “the participation of the victims at this stage of the proceedings would prejudice
the rights of the Defence.”162 In nearly identical filings in the DRC
and Darfur situations, the OPCD also challenged the application
process, contending that the Chambers could not rule on the applications without considering information which might contradict
the applicants’ claims.163 The OPCD sought to have the judges require applicants to participate to disclose information which might
tend to impugn their own credibility or establish that injuries were
pre-existing.164 It requested that the Chambers order the OTP to
160

See id. ¶¶ 50-51; see also Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re
Applicants a/0001/06 to a/0003/06, supra note 154, ¶¶ 25-26 (noting that confirmation hearing had been postponed once already and that the admission of
victim-participants would “inevitably delay them further” and deprive the defense of “the means and resources . . . to ensure the accused’s right to a defence
as guaranteed by the Statute”).
161
See First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-7; First DRC Grant of
Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-7. Presumably the OPCD was referring to the pretrial phase, as arrest warrants had been issued in that situation.
162
The quotation in the text is the Single Judge’s characterization, as stated in
the 6 December 2007 Darfur decision, supra note 82, at 4, but the OPCD submission—a filing entitled “Observations on Applications a/0011/06 to
a/0015/06,” numbered ICC-02/05-80-Conf, and dated 8 June 2007, see id. at 4
n.9–is not publicly available.
163
See OPCD Darfur Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants, supra
note 79; OPCD Darfur Request for Exculpatory Materials, supra note 79; Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-382, Request for the Single Judge to
Order the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e), Public (Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter OPCD DRC Request for
Addt’l Information from Applicants]; Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC01/04-378, Request for Single Judge to Order the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Materials, Public (Aug. 28, 2007) [hereinafter OPCD DRC Request for
Exculpatory Materials].
164
See, e.g., OPCD DRC Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants, supra
note 163, ¶ 81 (seeking information of any pre-existing medical condition suffered by applicant, national investigations or convictions of applicant, and relationships between applicant and other applicants).
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disclose information that might undermine applicants’ claims that
the acts from which they suffered were crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction. The OPCD specified, for example, that it sought information from the OTP suggesting that there was no “armed conflict” in the DRC or that the villages mentioned in the applications
had been legitimate military targets.165
¶49
The OPCD applications were rejected by Single Judges in
both the Darfur and DRC situations, based on identical reasoning:
that because the process of admitting victims to participate “is not
related to questions pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the suspect or accused person or to the credibility of Prosecution witnesses,” it was unnecessary to expand the information-seeking
which precedes decisions on applications to participate.166 On January 23, 2008, however, the same judges granted leave to appeal
their denial of the OPCD motions, and particularly the issue of
whether a “procedural status of victim” can be granted during the
investigation or in pre-trial proceedings.167 This was the set of decisions that also sought appellate guidance on “how applications
for participation at the investigation stage of a situation and the
pre-trial stage of a case must be dealt with.”168 On February 6,
2008, the Single Judges in the Darfur and DRC situations again
165

See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25-38; OPCD Darfur Request for Exculpatory Materials, supra note 79, ¶¶ 29-40.
166
3 December 2007 Darfur Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and Exculpatory Information, supra note 76, ¶ 20; Situation in the DRC, Situation No.
ICC-01/04-417, Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of
Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the
Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the
Prosecutor, Public, ¶ 11 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter DRC
Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and Exculpatory Information].
167
See First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 7-8; First DRC Grant of
Appeal, supra note 1, at 7-8. Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the DRC situation, and the
Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II, in the Uganda situation, had previously
declined to permit appeal of the same issue, insofar as it concerned investigation. See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-135-tEN, Decision on
the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of
17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Public (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Mar. 31, 2006); Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-112,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on
Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06,
a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber
II, Dec. 19, 2007).
168
First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 8; First DRC Grant of Appeal,
supra note 1, at 8.
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granted leave to appeal the same issues, after the OPCD and OTP
sought leave to appeal the December 6, 2007 decision of the Single
Judge in the Darfur situation,169 and the OPCD, the OTP and victims’ representatives sought leave to appeal a December 24, 2007
decision by the Single Judge in the DRC situation, which undertook to decide approximately 140 applications for victims’ participation.170
¶50
In briefs filed in support of the pending appeals, the OPCD
and the OTP are thus joined in arguing that the Chambers have
erred in creating a “procedural status of victim” which is nowhere
recognized in the Rome Statute or the RPE171 and which wrongly
relies, as the OPCD has put it, “on generic presumptions concerning all applicants, and all situation and pre-trial phases at the ICC,”
rather than on a “specific determination” regarding “personal interests” affected by an actual proceeding in the situation or pre-trial
phase.172 The parties also are agreed that the Statute requires a
Chamber to determine, with respect to concrete proceedings, and
in a single step, the personal interests and the appropriateness of
the participation, given likely effects on the defense and the proceedings as a whole.173 Both the OTP and the defense have called
attention to the illogic, and the waste, in determining and granting
the “status of victim” in relation to hypothetical “proceedings.”174
169

See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-121, Decision on the
Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Application for Participation
of Victims in the Proceedings in the Situation, Public, 4-5, 11 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Feb. 6, 2008).
170
See Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01/04-444, Decision on the Prosecution, OPCD, and OPCV Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Applications for Participation of Victims in the Proceedings in the Situation, Public, 6, 15 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Feb. 6, 2008).
171
See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶ 23;
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-125, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against the 6 December 2007 Decision on the Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, Public, ¶ 14 (Feb. 18,
2008) [hereinafter 18 Feb. 2008 OTP Appeal Brief].
172
4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 18-21.
173
See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 18-20;
18 Feb. 2008 OTP Appeal Brief, supra note 171, ¶¶ 17-18.
174
See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 19, 21;
18 Feb. 2008 OTP Appeal Brief, supra note 171, ¶ 35. Ad hoc defense counsel
appointed in the Uganda situation has also taken this view in appealing the Second Decision re Uganda Participation. See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal
Second Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 75, ¶ 30 (“If there are no
possible proceedings in which an applicant may participate or which require a
formal determination as to the victim’s status, issuing a general decision which
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¶51

On appeal, the OPCD has argued it would better protect the
rights of the defense, as well as the impartiality of the Chambers, if
views and concerns of victims during the investigation were directed at the OTP, which is charged with statutory obligations to
seek truth, to investigate exonerating circumstances, and to disclose exonerating information.175 During the investigation phase,
the OPCD has emphasized, the defense is indeed reliant on the
triggering of the OTP’s statutory obligations, because it “does not
have the possibility at the situation phase to challenge jurisdiction,
conduct investigations, or (as concluded by the Honourable Single
Judge) request disclosure from either the Prosecution or the applicants.”176
¶52
Additionally, the OPCD has contended that the opining of
ICC judges on allegations not related to any commenced ICC case
is inappropriate. According to the OTP, the ICC should not undertake to make pronouncements on matters that would “normally fall
purely within the competence of domestic authorities,” especially
in light of the fact that the ICC “has neither the obligation nor the
power to give effect to the right to a remedy for every potential
victim” within the territory of any State-party.177 The OPCD has
argued that overly broad victims’ participation, defined in relation
to all crimes within the potential jurisdiction of the Court rather
than “the overarching objectives (and limitations) of the ICC itself,” cannot help but begin to transform the ICC into “a broad
based forum for litigating all alleged violations of international
criminal law . . . .” or a “quasi-truth and reconciliation forum.”178
¶53
More recently, Lubanga’s defense counsel has had the
opportunity to address the ruling of Trial Chamber I establishing
standards for victim’s participation in the Lubanga case. By order
dated February 26, 2008, Trial Chamber I granted the OPCD and
the OTP leave to appeal the January 18, 2008 decision.179 Specifiwill never be implemented in practice affects the expeditious conduct of the proceedings, resulting in waste of time and resources for the Court instead of concentrating on concrete rights.”).
175
See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 37-48.
176
See id. ¶ 43.
177
See id. ¶¶ 48-54.
178
See id. ¶¶ 3-5, 53-54.
179
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1191, Decision on the Defence and Prosecution Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Public (Trial Chamber I, Feb.
26, 2008) [hereinafter Decision Granting Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Par-
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cally, Trial Chamber I granted leave to appeal the question of
“whether the harm alleged by a victim and the concept of ‘personal
interests’ under Article 68 of the Statute must be linked with
charges against the accused.”180 The parties also obtained leave to
address “whether it is possible for victims participating at trial to
lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused
and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”181
The Appeals Chamber is thus poised to consider the breadth of victims’ participation in cases and investigations and the proper relation between the standards governing participation in those two
phases.
¶54
Notably, while the Pre-Trial Chambers had deemed the topic
of the proper definition of “personal interests” worthy of appeal
mainly because of potential effects on the efficiency of proceedings,182 Trial Chamber I openly acknowledged that the issue affected fairness to the defense. Trial Chamber I confirmed that its
decision of January 18, 2008 contemplated permitting victims to
introduce evidence at trial,183 and expressed that the extent of victims’ participation was bound to alter the content and length of the
case, by “affect[ing] the nature and extent of the evidence called
and the issues raised.”184 The Trial Chamber conceded that while
“the impugned decision does not have the effect per se of shifting
the burden of proof,” the decision “could lead, in particular circumstances and in some degree, to such an effect, and this could
ticipation Decision]. In the trial phase, Lubanga has been represented by Catherine Mabille. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06-932-tENG, Registration of Solemn Undertaking by Ms Catherine Mabille
and of Her Undertaking Under Article 22(3) of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, Public (Trial Chamber I, July 6, 2007).
180
See Decision Granting Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Decision, supra note 179, ¶¶ 29-34, 54.
181
See id. ¶¶ 39-42, 54. Trial Chamber I granted leave to appeal a third issue:
“Whether the notion of victim necessarily implies the existence of personal and
direct harm.” See id. ¶¶ 26-28, 54.
182
See, e.g., First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-8 (characterizing
issue as involving “risk of consecutive multiple applications [to participate]”
which in turn affects “the efficient and effective operation of the Court as a
whole”); First DRC Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-8 (same).
183
See Decision Granting Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Decision, supra note 179, ¶ 42 (analyzing whether the fair and expeditious conduct
of proceedings would be affected by “the introduction of evidence touching on
the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused” and “considering evidence
that otherwise would not be available”).
184
See id. ¶ 33.
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significantly affect the fairness of the proceedings pursuant to Article 67(1)(i) of the Statute.”185
¶55
On the topic of whether participation at trial must be
conditioned on harm suffered as a result of a charged crime,
Lubanga’s trial counsel has relied extensively upon Judge Blattman’s reasoning that it exceeds the competence of the ICC, imperils the fairness of ICC proceedings, and violates fundamental principles of criminal law, including the principle of legality, to fail to
require the link.186 Lubanga’s counsel has contended, in addition,
that to permit victims to become witnesses and sources of evidence: (1) fails to observe the limitation that victims participate by
voicing “views and concerns,” and that witnesses may only be
questioned with approval of the Chamber, and only when their personal interests are affected;187 (2) accords rights to victims which
the legislator clearly had intended to reserve to the parties;188 and
(3) wrongly relieves the Prosecution of its unique burden of proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.189
III. ICC PERFORMANCE IN PROVIDING MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION
¶56

Pre-Trial Chamber I aspired in its January 17, 2006 decision
to afford a “right of access” to victims and “to enable them to exercise that right concretely and effectively.”190 Over two years
later, this objective has not been met, nor is it certain that it can be
185

Id. ¶ 42.
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1135,
Requête de la Défense solicitant l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de la « Decision
on Victims’ Participation » rendue le 18 janvier 2008, Public, ¶¶ 29-30 (Jan. 28,
2008), [hereinafter Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Decision]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06-1220, Acte d’appel de la Défense relativement à la Décision du 18 janvier
2008 de la Chambre de première instance I concernant la participation des victimes, Public, ¶¶ 34-39 (Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Defense Brief in Support of
Appeal of Lubanga Trial Participation Decision].
187
See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶¶ 42-43; Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga
Trial Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶¶ 45-47.
188
See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶ 44; Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga Trial
Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶49.
189
See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶ 42; Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga Trial
Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶ 48.
190
See 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 71.
186
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met. Victims’ participation has been substantive and unique in
some case proceedings, such as Lubanga’s confirmation hearing
and pre-trial proceedings. The considerable effort expended by the
judges and the participants in attempting to define and provide
meaningful victims’ participation, however, has not yielded a coherent or workable system of providing concrete participation.
The progression of decisions of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers
reflects an evolution from conviction that broad participation can
be conferred, to uncertainty in the first standards chosen, to hope
that the Appeals Chamber will find solutions from among the disparate, potentially controversial, and burdensome standards implemented by the lower Chambers.
¶57
Facts not acknowledged by the Chambers are also a source
of unease. The filing of mere hundreds of applications to participate in ICC proceedings has overburdened the participation
framework. The pace of adjudicating the applications is glacial,
and side litigation over the application process is flourishing. Nor
is the unwieldy process yielding benefits for victims. As of May 1,
2008, over two years after the first victims’ participation decision,
substantive participation in proceedings remains limited to a handful of victims who are participating in the Lubanga case.
¶58
There are three noteworthy aspects of the ICC’s track record:
(1) the inability of the Chambers to render timely or effective decisions on applications to participate; (2) the volume and depth of
litigation regarding matters related to the process of adjudicating
applications to participate, and the effect of that litigation on Court
proceedings generally; and (3) the failure of the Court to provide
meaningful victims’ participation to more victims, or outside the
instances of participation that are explicitly set forth in the Rome
Statute.
A. The Failure to Keep Pace in Processing Applications to
Participate
¶59

The most fundamental problem in providing meaningful
participation to victims has been the inability of the Chambers to
process applications to participate in a timely fashion, or to generate decisions resulting in actual participation. The OTP, in early
submissions regarding victims’ participation, had raised the specter
of hundreds of thousands of applicants to participate, given the

498

ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW

[Vo l. 6

broad scope of ICC investigations.191 From court records it appears that approximately five hundred applicants—from among all
the victims of the conflicts in Darfur, the DRC, northern Uganda
and the CAR—had sought participation as of this writing, in May
2008. That relatively modest number nonetheless has been ample
to demonstrate the weakness in the participation scheme and to
burden the Court’s operations. Also as of May 2008, the Chambers have succeeded in granting less than 110 applicants, in any of
the ICC’s investigations, even the “status of victim” vis-à-vis the
investigation, i.e., the theoretical right to participate. It is not apparent that a single victim has actually participated in an investigation phase proceeding or provided any view or concern that affected any investigation. Eighteen victims of the conflicts in the
DRC, northern Uganda, and Darfur have obtained the “status of
victim” in case proceedings, and only four of those are actually
participating, in the Lubanga case. Finally, applicants typically
wait for over a year, and some have waited for over a year and a
half, to learn the disposition of their requests to participate.
¶60
Applications to participate in ICC proceedings can be
delayed in one of two places in the ICC: (1) in the Registry, the
administrative organ of the ICC, because the Registry is the first to
receive applications and also bears the responsibility of forwarding
groups of applications to the Chambers, together with a covering
report required by ICC Regulation 86(5);192 or (2) in Chambers,
because a Chamber is in the process of receiving observations from
the parties pursuant to Rule 89(1), has sought supplementation
from the applicants or the Registry, or has decided to defer consideration. The relevant figures, drawn from information publicly
available as of May 1, 2008, are as follows. (To make it possible
for this chart to appear on one page, notes to the chart (i.e., notes i
to viii) appear in an Addendum to this article.)
191

See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶ 5 (“Given the massive scale of alleged criminality in the DRC,
this ruling could result in tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of individuals, having the right to participate in the investigation stage.”).
192
The regulation provides: “The Registrar shall present all applications described in this regulation to the Chamber together with a report thereon. The
Registrar shall endeavour to present one report for a group of victims, taking
into consideration the distinct interests of the victims.” Regulations of the
Court, adopted on 26 May 2004 by the Judges of the Court, Fifth Plenary Session, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Chapter 5, The Hague, 17-28 May 2004, at Reg. 86(5)
[hereinafter ICC Regulations]. In practice, the preparation of the report has been
assigned to the VPRS.
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Chart: Adjudication of Applications to Participate
ICC Situation

Applications
Received by
Registryi
Applications
Forwarded by
Registry to
Chamberii
Applicants
Granted “Status of Victim”
in Situation/
Caseiii
Applicants
Denied “Status
of Victim” in
Situation/
Caseiv
Applications
Pending in
Chambers in
Situation/Casev
Dates on which
Applications
Forwarded to
Chambers were
Filed or Registered by the
Registryviii

¶61

DRC

Uganda

Darfur

CAR

Total

344

127

38

0

509

186

49

21

0

256

82/9

14/9

11/0

0

107/18

3/70

1/6

10/0

0

14/76

101/107

35/35vi

3/21vii

0

139/163

June 2005
to Apr.
2007, and
Jan. 2008

June to
Nov., 2006

June 2006
to July
2007

n/a

n/a

These figures demonstrate the following:


At least 509 applications to participate in ICC proceedings, and likely a higher number, have been received by the Registry. 193 The number of applications to participate has been deduced from the identification numbers assigned by the Registry to applicants to participate. For example, in the DRC
situation, the highest number assigned to an applica-

193
One source reported at the end of 2007 that “approximately 500 victims have
applied to participate in proceedings at the court and most are still waiting to
find out if they will be accepted.” IWPR Report, supra note 7. From the context, it appears that the reported figure was supplied by the Registry. See id.
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tion, and known from public filings, is a/0337/07,194
presumably meaning that at least 337 applicants
have received “a” or applicant numbers. The figure
in the chart is 344 rather than 337 because one
number with an “08” prefix is known to have been
assigned,195 and the six applicants who were the
subject of the 17 January 2006 decision in the DRC
situation were not assigned “a” numbers, but instead
received designations “VPRS 1” to “VPRS 6.”196
The reason that the first column of the chart likely
understates the total number of applications is that
in the Uganda and Darfur situations, the last applications known to exist because of public court filings were ones submitted by victims in July 2007
(see last column of chart). This means that any applications received by the Registry in those situations since mid-2007 are not reflected in the chart.
Applications received by the Registry since January
2008 in the DRC situation likewise are not reflected.
The Chambers have called for the observations of
the parties on a total of 256 applications, which
means that about 50% of the 509 applications believed to have been received by the Registry
through January 2008 remain pending in the Registry.
If one assumes that each applicant has applied to
participate in all phases of proceedings (i.e., investigation, pre-trial proceedings, and case), 197 only

194
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC/01/04-01/07-357, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0327/07 to a/0337/07 and a/0001/08, Public (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Apr. 2, 2008).
195
See id. (noting applicant a/0001/08). There appear to have been a total of 337
applicants in the DRC situation in the years 2006 and 2007, because no number
from 1 to 337 is duplicated in those years, despite the change in suffix from “06”
to “07”.
196
17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 1.
197
It is the practice of most applicants to seek participation in all phases. For
example, of the twenty-one applications in the Darfur situation that have been
considered by the Single Judge, all contained requests “to participate in all stages of the proceedings.” See 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, ¶
8. The forty-nine applications so far considered in the Uganda situation each
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104, or 20%, of applicants to participate have obtained even a theoretical right to participate in an
investigation. Only eighteen, or 4%, of applicants
who submitted their applications before July 2007
have obtained even a theoretical right to participate
in an ICC case.
The Chambers have yet to make final determinations regarding the status of victim, in the situation
and case, on well over half of the applications
which were filed with the Registry between June
2005 and January 2008 and remain pending before
the Chambers.

One dimension not adequately depicted in the numbers of
applications processed is the extent of the delay between the submission of the application and the issuance of any decision either
to grant “the status of victim” or to deny it, in either the situation
or the case. Most applicants wait more than a year to obtain the
theoretical right to participate, in either the situation or the case,
and for many applicants the process is circular and timeconsuming because the Chamber’s “decision” is to defer consideration of the application or to deem it incomplete. For example,
in the DRC situation, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued, on December 24,
2007, a decision initially addressing one group of 140 applications
to participate in proceedings.198 All 140 applications had been
sought participation at all stages of the proceedings. See Prosecutor v. Joseph
Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-134, Decision on Legal Representation, Appointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures, and Time-Limit for
Submission of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06,
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06, and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06,
Public, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Feb. 1, 2007). The largest group of applications forwarded to the parties for the making of observations consisted of seventy-five applications in the DRC situation. See 23 May 2007 DRC Decision
Authorizing Observations, supra note 147. Of that group, according to the
OTP’s submission under Rule 89(1), sixty-five applicants sought to participate
in the investigation, sixty-eight sought to participate in the pre-trial phase, and
seventy-four sought participation at trial. See OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission, supra note 134, ¶ 2.
198
Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr, Corrigendum à la «
Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure déposées dans le cadre
de l’enquête en République démocratique du Congo par a/0004/06 à a/0009/06,
a/0016/06 à a/0063/06 a/0071/06 à a/0080/06 et a/0105/06 à a/0110/06,
a/0188/06, a/0128/06 à a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06,
a/0220/06 à a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06, a/0230/06, a/0234/06 à a/0236/06,
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filed with the Registry at least eight months prior, and some had
been filed more than a year and a half before the Chamber issued
its decision.199 In its December 2007 decision, moreover, the
Chamber failed to reach any determination on over half of the 140
applications considered, thus ensuring that many applicants would
continue to wait further for any disposition.200 Similarly, when in
August 2007 the Single Judge in the Uganda situation first considered the first forty-nine applications upon which the parties had
submitted observations, only seven applications were resolved, and
forty-two were deferred.201 The forty-two applicants whose requests had been deferred then waited another seven months, until
March 2008, when the Single Judge issued the next decision reconsidering their applications.202 This second decision resolved
another thirteen applications, leaving thirty-five applicants, of the
forty-nine originally in the group, who yet had no decision from
the Chamber, despite having applied to participate at least one year
and four months previously.203
¶63
Notably, the delay just described precedes any attempt to
carry out the second step of the two-stage analysis adopted by the
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers: the assessment of whether the theoretical right should be translated to actual participation, based on
consideration, inter alia, of the potential effects of the proposed
participation on fairness and efficiency. The second step, of deciding to permit participation in specific proceedings has, in case proceedings, been carried out only in connection with the four victims
who have been participating in the Lubanga case since 2006 and
another five applicants who in April 2008 obtained the right to participate in the second DRC case, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.204 In the ICC investigations, of the
a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 à a/0233/06, a/0237/06 à a/0239/06
et a/0241/06 à a/0250/06 », Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation]. The decision was reissued by means of the Corrigendum, dated 31 January 2008, which does not
acknowledge that the original decision was issued on 24 December 2007.
199
See id. at 3-5.
200
See id. at 57-59.
201
See 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 2-3, 61-62.
202
See Second Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 74.
203
See id. at 2-3, 70-71.
204
The other nine victims who obtained the “status of victim” in a case did so in
the Kony proceeding, in which there has been no arrest. See supra note iii and
accompanying text.
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107 applicants who have obtained a theoretical right to participate,
the vast majority have never pursued any request to participate in a
specific proceeding. Others have participated, thus far, only in the
proceedings relating to the existence or scope of the right to participate. Only a handful of the 107 “situation victims” have even
arguably been permitted to participate in any investigation-phase
proceeding. As is related infra in Part III.C, six applicants granted
the “status of victim” in the DRC situation requested further information about the OTP’s investigative strategy in the DRC, but
Pre-Trial Chamber I denied the request.
¶64
The Chambers embraced a system requiring application-byapplication consideration at each of the two stages, with the view
that the granting of a broad theoretical right could be balanced by a
separate consideration of the effects of participation. The operation of the system, however, seems to be proving that victims will
continue to fail to obtain actual participation, because both steps of
the analysis are strongly resistant to completion.
B. The Proliferation of Litigation Relating to Victims’
Participation
¶65

Contributing to the slow pace at which applications to
participate have proceeded to actual participation is an entirely
predictable circumstance: the opening of the door to victim’s participation has correspondingly opened an entire area of litigation
relating to the novel right. The OTP, defense counsel, and victims’
representatives have raised and briefed—and the ICC judges have
adjudicated—dozens of issues relating to the process of submitting, evaluating, and adjudicating applications to participate. In
addition to such fundamental questions as the proper definition of
“personal interests” in Article 68(3), or the extent of informationgathering that a Chamber must undertake in determining whether
to grant an application to participate, this litigation has addressed
numerous other issues, including:


205

Whether applicants or individuals granted the status
of victim are entitled to protective measures furnished by the Court;205

See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 73 (referencing
Art. 57(3)(c), which among other things, empowers Pre-Trial Chambers to pro-
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Which parties, participants, and counsel are entitled
to know the identities of the applicants, and
when;206
Whether the form distributed by the Registry to applicants adequately records the circumstances in
which the application was completed;207
The extent of the duties that the Office of Public
Counsel for Victims (“OPCV”) may perform on behalf of applicants who have no legal representative;208
The extent to which non-public information and
evidence should be made available to participating
victims or applicants to participate;209

vide protective measures to victims and witnesses); OTP’s 28 February 2007
Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 15; 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision,
supra note 47, ¶¶ 98-99; Situation in Darfur, Situation No. ICC-02/05-81, Prosecution’s Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0011/06, a/0012/06, a/0013/06, a/0014/06 and a/0015/06 in the Situation
in Darfur, the Sudan, Public, ¶ 27 (June 8, 2007).
206
See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal,
supra note 129, ¶¶ 5-6, 36-47 (seeking leave to appeal practice of Pre-Trial
Chamber I to provide redacted applications to defense); Situation in the DRC,
Situation No. ICC-01/04-374, Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of Applicants on Application Process for Victims’ Participation and Legal
Representation, Public, ¶¶ 16-29 (Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter 17 August 2007
DRC Decision on Application Process] (resolving dispute between OPCV and
OPCD as to whether OPCD was entitled to unredacted versions of victims’ applications); Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-209, Decision on Prosecutor’s “Application to Lift Redactions from Applications for Victims’ Participation to be Provided to the OTP” and on the Prosecution’s Further
Submissions Supplementing such Application, and Request for Extension of
Time, Public, 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Feb. 20, 2007) (denying OTP’s request to
be furnished with unredacted versions of applications to participate in situation
and case).
207
See, e.g., OPCD DRC Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants, supra
note 163, ¶¶ 20-21; DRC Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and Exculpatory Information, supra note 166, ¶ 15.
208
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-243, Decision on the OPCV’s Observations on Victims’ Applications and on the Prosecution’s Objections Thereto, Public, 4-6 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Apr. 16, 2007)
(dismissing as inadmissible OPCV submission in the case and situation on behalf of applicants, on ground that it is beyond the OPCV’s mandate of providing
support and assistant to legal representative of victims).
209
See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶¶ 74, 76 (stating
that Chamber will determine on case-by-case basis whether to admit victims to
proceedings otherwise conducted in closed session; also denying applicants access to non-public documents “for the time being”); OTP’s 28 February 2007
Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 18 & n.31 (arguing that expansion of
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Whether and at what stage a participating victim
may remain anonymous without infringing the
rights of accused persons;210
Whether representatives of applicants or victims are
entitled to remain anonymous;211
The extent to which common representatives should
be appointed for participating victims;212
Whether applicants granted the status of victim are
entitled to a presumption of indigence such that the
Court should bear the expenses of their representation.213

These issues suggest the dimensions of the burden imposed
on the participants, the judges, and the Registry. As to any group
of applications under consideration, the Chamber must resolve all
of the preliminary disputes about the application process before it
may proceed to granting or denying even the “status of victim.”
Applications are often found to be deficient under the developing
standards, and thus are deferred, supplemented, and then reconsidparticipation rights should not lead to disclosure of investigative activities to
victims); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/061211, Decision on the Role of the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and Its
Request for Access to Documents, Public, ¶ 40 (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 6, 2008)
(declining to permit the OPCV, who represented applicants to participate in the
case, same access to non-public information as representatives of victims).
210
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06462, Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06,
a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, Public, 5-7 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 22, 2006) (determining that victims who obtained right to participate in confirmation hearing could only remain anonymous if they did not
“add any point of fact or evidence at all to the Prosecution’s case-file . . . in the
notification of charges document and the list of evidence,” and thus that they
could not question the witnesses); Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 130-31 (rejecting arguments of defense and the OTP that victims
should not be permitted to testify anonymously at trial).
211
See, e.g., 17 August 2007 DRC Decision on Application Process, supra note
206, ¶¶ 30-31, 45-48.
212
See, e.g., Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 123-26.
213
See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-494, Demande de réexamen de la “Décision du Greffier sur la demande d’aide judiciaire aux frais de la
Cour déposé par Maître Keta au nom des victimes des victimes a/0016/06,
a/0018/06, a/0021/06, a/0025/06, a/0028/06, a/0031/06, a/0032/06, a/0034/06,
a/0042/06, a/0044/06, a/0045/06, a/0142/06, a/0148/06, a/0150/06, a/0188/06,
a/0199/06, a/0028/06” datée du 28 Mars 2008 selon la norme 85.3 du Règlement
de la Cour, Public, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2008) (request by legal representative of victims).
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ered. The decisions undertaking to render determinations on the
“status of victim” are lengthy and onerous to compose, because
individual consideration of each application is required. Finally,
the announcement of any new standard, or submission of supplemental information, can itself open other doors to new legal challenges.
¶67
The public record of ICC proceedings makes it possible to
begin to quantify the time and energy expended in administering
the victim participation system. Under this author’s count, and
again as of May 1, 2008, the Chambers have rendered over 100
decisions relating to the process of obtaining victims’ participation.
Filings by the participants on the same topic number over 180.214
The relevant material consists of thousands of pages, and represented by the material are thousands of man-hours of the work of
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and victims’ representatives.
The Registry additionally bears a considerable burden, because it
routinely conducts missions to the field to educate potential situation and case victims, to obtain applications, to gather information
to include in its reporting under Rule 86(5), and to seek supplementation of applications deemed by the judges to be incomplete.
The Registry units of the OPCD, OPCV and the Victim Participation and Reparation Section (“VPRS”), have also been heavily involved in litigation relating to victims’ participation, especially in
the investigation phase, although the mandate of each unit embraces several other duties.215
214

The figures count only public decisions and submissions relating to the process of obtaining participation rights. They exclude submissions by participating
victims expressing “views and concerns” in specific proceedings, or filings by
the parties responding to such submissions.
215
The duties of the OPCD include representing the interests of defendants during the initial stages of the investigation, see ICC Regulations, at Reg. 77(4),
and “provid[ing] support and assistance” to defense counsel, including “legal
research and assistance” and help in appearing before the Chamber, see id. at
Reg. 77(5). The OPCV can be appointed to represent participating victims, see
id., at Reg. 80(2), but also has duties to “provide support and assistance to the
legal representative for victims and to victims,” see id. at Reg. 81(4). The VPRS
is charged with receiving applications for participation and reparations, helping
victims to organize their representation, providing the notifications to victims
which must occur under the RPE, for example, when the Prosecutor determines
to open an investigation proprio motu, and publicizing the Court’s proceedings,
including reparations proceedings. See Participation of victims in proceedings,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/victimsissues/victimsparticipation.html (last visited June
10,
2008);
Reparations
for
Victims,
http://www.icccpi.int/victimsissues/victimsreparation.html (last visited June 10, 2008).
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¶68

Examination of the litigation related to victims’ participation
led the WCRO to conclude, in its November 2007 report, that the
trade-off between effective participation and the efficiency of court
proceedings was proving to be unfavorable. It noted that “despite
the slow process of evaluating victims’ applications and the small
number of successful applications to date, the ICC victim participation scheme has consumed a substantial part of the Court’s resources since January 2006.”216 It also concluded that “the detailed, individualized procedure developed by the Court to review
victims is a drain on the resources of the Prosecutor and Defence . .
. .”217 Since the issuance of the WCRO Report, trial-phase work
has also been affected by the resource drain. The starting date for
the ICC’s first trial—the Lubanga trial—was postponed from
March 31, 2008 to June 23, 2008, shortly after Trial Chamber I’s
February 26, 2008 decision to grant leave to the parties to appeal
issues relating to victims’ participation at trial.218
¶69
The question is the extent to which the litigation regarding
victims’ participation could be mitigated, given the reality that, in a
court of limited resources, every resource expended to implement
the victim participation framework is a resource that cannot be
used to support other court activities. These alternative activities
would include, for example, continuing or expanding the number
of investigations and cases, providing protection for victims and
witnesses who will appear in court, supplementing the resources of
defense counsel, or providing hearings and trials more expeditiously. Some of the expenditure and delay associated with providing victims’ participation is unavoidable, because incorporating
meaningful participation into court proceedings necessitates the
setting of legal standards, outreach efforts, and adjudication of applications. Still, the developing record identifies certain circumstances that are failing to bring reward, either to victims or the
Court. One is the failure of the Chambers and judges to harmonize
216

WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 5.
Id. at 60.
218
See ICC Press Release, Trial in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Will
Commence on 23 June 2008 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/348.html; Transcript in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-75-ENG (Feb. 13, 2008), at 2-4 (explaining that Trial Chamber I was contemplating delaying trial because of OTP
delay in completing disclosure and Chamber’s intention to grant leave to appeal
victims’ participation decision).
217
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the governing legal standards. The preference for innovation, or
“concessions,” at the expense of pragmatic, non-controversial
rulemaking, has fostered uncertainty and delay. Years into the
ICC’s operations, there is a substantial possibility that the Appeals
Chamber will change, yet again, the standards governing victims’
participation.
¶70
The step of granting hypothetical rights has also diverted
significant time and energy. If it typically takes a year or more to
adjudicate an applicant’s right to participate, it appears particularly
unproductive for the Chambers to grant hypothetical rights to participate in any case in which arrest has yet to be effected. A logical priority would be for Pre-Trial Chambers to focus on pre-trial
issues arising in cases involving defendants in custody, and to adjudicate applications to participate in cases only after a defendant
has come into custody. The record also indicates that individuals
granted “the status of victim,” particularly in the investigation, are
rarely seeking participation in any specific proceeding.219 It might
better serve the Court, and victims, for Chambers to decline to
grant any right to participate, in the absence of greater specification by the applicant of the proceedings in which he or she wishes
to participate.
¶71
All of the time and resources expended to administer the
general right to participate in the investigation are particularly susceptible to critical review. The difficulty of adjudicating the first
few hundred applications to participate, and the failure of the general right to produce actual participation during investigations,
suggests strongly that it may have been ill-considered for the Court
to undertake to provide general participation in the investigation
before settling the practice of administering far less controversial
participation rights.
¶72
Moreover, the theoretical right to participate in the investigation is the right most removed from the core mandate of the Court
and most likely to raise false expectations among applicants. In
over two years, only eighteen applicants have successfully obtained participation in a case, and all eighteen have qualified under
the rule that such participation requires the applicant to have suffered from a charged crime.220 The figure shows that if the rule
219

See discussion infra in Part III.C.
This is because Trial Chamber I, the Chamber which disagreed with that rule,
has yet to apply its more generous test for granting the potential right to participate in a case.
220
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requiring the causal link between the charged crime and the harm
suffered by the victim is upheld on appeal, even victims who successfully obtain the status of victim in the investigation are highly
unlikely to qualify to participate in any ICC case. Most of the energy now expended in providing victims’ participation is thus devoted to granting a theoretical right to victims of crimes and perpetrators who are not, and are likely never to become, the subject of
any ICC case.
¶73
As the foregoing suggests, identifying and remedying
inefficient and unproductive efforts will ultimately better serve victims in addition to the Court itself. A resource drain created by the
victims’ participation framework prejudices victims by delaying
the meting of justice as well as victims’ participation in the judicial
process. It is less acknowledged but equally true that poor administration of participation rights also constrains the number of victims who can participate and the extent of their participation.
C. Victims’ Inability to Obtain Meaningful Participation
¶74

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current victims’
participation framework is that the extent of meaningful participation has been negligible. The process of granting the participation
right has been intense and all-consuming, whereas the incorporation of the substance of victims’ “views and concerns” in underlying ICC proceedings has been meager.
¶75
It should be clarified at the outset that by “meaningful
participation” is meant the participation intended in the Statute: the
actual expression of views and concerns by victims in proceedings
following the determination that their participation is appropriate.
The Chambers have thus far purported to be granting nothing less
than such a “concrete” and “effective” right.221 Victims’ representatives likewise have not characterized the objective of Article
68(3) to be the distribution of theoretical or hypothetical rights.
Rather they have adopted the strategy of pursuing concrete participation in the broadest range of proceedings222 while articulating,
221

See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 71.
See, e.g. Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-106, Response of
Legal Representative of Victims a/0101/06 and a/0119/06 to the “Prosecution’s
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06,” Public, ¶ 23 (Aug. 31, 2007) (arguing that victims
222
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for example, that victims’ “enjoyment of their right to participate
in the proceedings,” cannot be impaired by “technical difficulties,”
such as a lack of Court resources.223
¶76
Some differentiation between the investigation and case
phases is necessary in evaluating the extent of meaningful victims’
participation, so defined. The general right to participate in the
investigation phase is failing conspicuously to yield meaningful
participation. Of the 107 or so applicants who have succeeded in
obtaining the procedural status of victim vis-à-vis an investigation,
only six have made any request related to any investigation, and
the two applications they submitted were rejected. The two requests that the Chamber considered were made in the DRC investigation,224 and concerned an issue which the victims likely viewed
to be of great importance to their “personal interests”: the scope
and direction of the OTP’s investigation, following an OTP announcement, in June 2006, that it had temporarily suspended the
bringing of additional charges against Lubanga.225 The victims requested that Pre-Trial Chamber I order the OTP to provide more
information about the DRC investigation, in light of what they
termed the OTP’s “tacit decision not to prosecute under article

should be permitted to participate in investigation because “their participation
can serve to clarify the facts and to assist the Court to fight impunity”).
223
See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-105-tEN, Observations of
the Legal Representative of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 following the Prosecution’s
Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber 1’s Decision on the Applications for Participation in Proceedings of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, Public, ¶¶ 21-26
(Jan. 27, 2006).
224
The two submissions by victims, ICC-01/04-213-Conf-Exp, and ICC-01/04214-Conf-Exp, and the OTP responses, remain non-public, but are known from
the resulting decision. See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-399,
Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative for Victims VPRS 1 to
VPRS 6 Regarding “Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation,” Public
(Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter 26 September 2007 DRC Decision on Victims’
Applications re Scope of Investigation]. The conclusion that only these two applications have been made by individuals granted the “status of victim” is necessarily drawn from publicly available documents and filings. The WCRO Report
deems as another instance of victims’ participation in a proceeding the submission of the victims’ representative relating to the OTP’s request to appeal the
January 17, 2006 decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I. See WCRO Report, supra
note 6, at 5. This request sought the right to participate, however, instead of
providing “views and concerns” in a substantive proceeding.
225
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-170,
Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, Public Formatted and Redacted Document, ¶ 11 (June 28, 2006).
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53(2)(c).”226 They also requested that the OTP be required to inform the Chamber of any information which might bear on the
need to “preserve evidence” relating to the crimes from which they
themselves had suffered. 227 After a year passed, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued its ruling. The Chamber determined, without extended
discussion, that because the OTP had taken no decision not to investigate or prosecute, under paragraphs 1(c) or 2(c) of Article 53,
and because there was no information that the OTP had not preserved evidence, the two victims’ applications should be rejected.228
¶77
The account of these requests by the victims is instructive.
Pre-Trial Chamber I had held out the offer of broad and independent victims’ participation during the investigation. When faced
with applications to obtain actual participation via these two applications, however, the Chamber in fact limited the victims to exactly the same participation right they would have obtained without the “general” participation right granted in the January 17,
2006 decision: the express right under Rule 92(2) to submit views
and concerns about any decision not to prosecute under the terms
of Article 53(1) or 53(2).229
¶78
In addition, the nearing of the end of one portion of the DRC
investigation serves to underscore that granting the “procedural
status of victim” vis-à-vis an investigation may often frustrate, rather than serve, victims’ interests. Earlier this year, the Prosecutor
suggested that the focus of OTP investigations in the DRC would
change from the Ituri district in Oriental Province to the provinces
of North and South Kivu.230 The 340 or so applicants who have
sought participation in the DRC investigation thus far, and the
226

See 26 September 2007 DRC Decision on Victims’ Applications re Scope of
Investigation, supra note 224, at 2-3.
227
See id.
228
See id. at 5-6.
229
See RPE, supra note 17, R. 92(2) (providing in relevant part, “In order to
allow victims to apply for participation in the proceedings in accordance with
rule 89, the Court shall notify victims concerning the decision of the Prosecutor
not to initiate an investigation or not to prosecute pursuant to article 53”).
230
See Associated Press, Congo turns over to international court colonel suspected of war crimes, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/07/europe/EU-GEN-War-CrimesCongo.php (“Now the Court is turning its attention to more recent violence in
the North and South Kivu regions of Congo, where forces loyal to rebel leader
Laurent Nkunda have been accused of widespread atrocities.”).
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eighty-odd who ultimately obtained the “status of victim” in that
investigation, are likely to have sought participation because they
were victims of crimes committed in Ituri, given the OTP’s early
announcements of an intent to focus investigative activities
there,231 and the fact that the first DRC cases involved Ituri armed
groups. If the DRC investigation, and proceedings related to that
investigation, now turn to the Kivus, the opportunities of the individuals who thus far have applied to participate in the DRC investigation are ending, without any such applicant having achieved
meaningful participation. These applicants also are highly unlikely
to be afforded the right to participate in the two pending cases relating to Ituri, at least based on previous decisions of the Pre-Trial
Chambers, unless they are found to be victims specifically of the
charged crimes.
¶79
In case proceedings, by contrast, there has been promising,
influential, and meaningful victim participation. Again, though,
the most prominent example was victim participation at the Lubanga confirmation hearing, and such participation is uncontroversial under the Statute in any event. At that hearing, conducted over
a period of days in November 2006, legal representatives of the
participating victims expressed “views and concerns” that were
uniquely informed by the victims’ experiences and desires.232 The
interventions were relevant, often eloquent, and did not lend themselves to criticism that they impaired either the fairness or the efficiency of the proceedings.233 Over a year after the confirmation
hearing, however, the same four victims who participated at con231

See, e.g., ICC Press Release, Communications Received by the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC, No. pids.009.2003-EN, at 2-3 (July 16, 2003) (announcing OTP intention to follow closely the situation in Ituri), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/mediaalert/16_july__english.pdf.
232
See Transcripts of Confirmation Hearing in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, Case Nos. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30-EN (Nov. 9, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06T-32-EN (Nov. 10, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-33-EN (Nov. 13, 2006), ICC01/04-01/06-T-34-EN (Nov. 14, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-37-EN (Nov. 15,
2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-38-EN (Nov. 20, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-39-EN
(Nov. 21, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-41-EN (Nov. 22, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06T-43-EN (Nov. 23, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-44-EN (Nov. 24, 2006), ICC01/04-01/06-T-45-EN (Nov. 27, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-47-EN (Nov. 28,
2006).
233
See id. The opening arguments of victims’ representatives can be found at
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30-EN (Nov. 9, 2006), at pp. 75-102, and their
closing arguments at Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-47-EN (Nov. 28, 2006), at
pp. 45-86.
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firmation remain the only ones who have qualified to participate in
the Lubanga case, despite the pendency of hundreds of applications. These four are in the position of representing thousands or
tens of thousands of children or family members who suffered
harm from the alleged crime perpetrated by Lubanga: helping to
implement a policy of conscription and enlisting children into his
militia group and using them in hostilities. They have not, however, been determined to be representative. They simply are the
few who have been fortunate enough to have had their applications
considered and ruled upon.
¶80
In addition, if the ruling of Trial Chamber I stands on appeal,
participation at the pre-trial and trial phases is likely to become
much more burdensome for victims to obtain. Applicants who
have participated in pre-trial proceedings in the Lubanga case have
qualified under the bright-line rule of having suffered from the
specific crimes charged in the case. The January 18, 2008 ruling
of Trial Chamber I, by contrast, would create a large class of theoretical participants—individuals who have been the victim of any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court—but require each of
those victims to demonstrate additionally that he or she holds information relevant to the issues and evidence being considered.
The inquiry will again be fact-intensive, and experience suggests
that timely adjudications are unlikely.
¶81
Rulings of the Chamber that expanded theoretical rights
were met with wide approval, especially by victims, but the vast
majority of applicants are overwhelmingly likely never to participate in specific proceedings. Representatives of victims have begun complaining about how difficult it has been to obtain victims’
participation and have acknowledged the challenge of maintaining
realistic expectations among clients who can easily and mistakenly
believe that an application to participate will lead inexorably to a
“day in court” and reparations.234 The challenge for the ICC is to
enhance real prospects for meaningful victims’ participation and to
234

See, e.g., VRWG Article re Darfur Applicants, supra note 7 (quoting legal
representatives of applicants in the Darfur situation: “We were surprised at how
difficult it turned out to be from a practical point of view “ and “the delay [in
obtaining decisions on the applications] is difficult to explain to our clients”);
IWPR Report, supra note 7 (reporting views of lawyers at Avocats Sans Frontières and REDRESS, and legal representatives of applicants in Darfur situation,
that applicants do not receive adequate legal aid from the ICC; ICC reported to
have stated that the 735,000 euro in the ICC budget available for legal aid for
victims would go to victims approved for participation).
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clarify standards to eliminate false expectations that can, over the
long-term, undermine the credibility of the Court and dishonor the
dignity of victims.
IV. SOURCES OF THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE GREATER MEANINGFUL
PARTICIPATION
¶82

Several broad causes of the ICC’s lack of success in
developing viable victims’ participation standards have particular
relevance to attempts to formulate strategies for strengthening the
participation framework.
A. Departure from the Balances Struck in the Rome Statute

¶83

One factor that has contributed prominently to the deficiencies in the victim participation system has been the repeated disregard of fundamental balances struck during the negotiation of the
Rome Statute. The decisions of the Chambers on the topic of victims’ participation have aspired to innovate; each Chamber and
Judge has eschewed limits in favor of granting more and more expansive forms of participation (in some cases, more expansive than
any participant had sought). The common shortcoming is the failure to acknowledge that the drafters of the Rome Statute fully considered the extent of victims’ participation and set limitations to
participation.
¶84
The first example of overreaching was the decision to create
a general right to participate in the investigation. The reasoning of
the January 17, 2006 decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I rebuffed the
proposition that formed the foundation for discussions at Rome:
that the rights of defendants and participation by victims must be
regarded as inherently in conflict. Thus Pre-Trial Chamber I
opined (and predicted) that it could expand victims’ participation
in investigations, while regulating, through later decisions, the adverse affects on defense rights. The passage of time has shown the
self-confidence of the Chamber to be less astute than the restraint
of the negotiators of the Rome Statute. Neither the Chambers, nor
victims, have identified any investigation-phase proceeding in
which victim participation can profitably occur, beyond the instances already expressly identified in the Statute. The Lubanga
defense, in the meantime, has compiled a record of the ways in
which the Chambers’ consideration of accounts of victimization
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may have prejudiced the defense or adversely affected the Chambers’ appearance of impartiality.
¶85
Instead of recognizing the necessity of limits, the methodology has been to justify each expansion of the participation right by
invoking recent, and significant, developments in a growing
movement to enhance the rights and entitlements of crime victims.
The Chambers have drawn support from both human rights jurisprudence and U.N. declarations. The January 17, 2006 Decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I, for example, relied on rulings from the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights in making its
central determination: that the objective or purpose pursued by
those Courts, of granting victims “an independent voice and role,”
justified conferring a general right to participate in an ICC investigation, even if the text of the Statute did not mandate that right.235
Trial Chamber I, two years later, used similar analysis in reasoning
that the Basic Victims Principles adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, which expressly declined to condition one’s status as a
“victim” upon any apprehension of a perpetrator, dictated that the
ICC should use the same definition.236
¶86
Both of these decisions wrongly departed from the outcomes
at Rome. The drafters were equally aware of the advances in human rights law in favor of granting “an independent voice” to victims, and of promoting the rights and entitlements of victims.237
235

See 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶¶ 50-54 (section entitled
“the teleological argument”). The Single Judge of the Uganda situation adopted
this reasoning. See 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶ 7.
236
See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 35, 92.
237
See WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 8 (“The unprecedented provisions for
victim participation in the proceedings of the International Criminal Court are
largely a product of a much broader movement in recent decades towards the
achievement of restorative–as opposed to strictly retributive–justice”) & 10
(“the drafters of the ICC Rome Statute were particularly influenced by United
Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Crime and
Abuse of Power” which was “the first formal recognition at the international
level that victims are entitled ‘access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt
redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the harm they have suffered’”) (quoting United National Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., 96th plenary mtg, Annex, U.N Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985));
Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 12, at 428-31 (describing that the broad
definition of victims in the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims and Crime and Abuse of Power was advocated before Rome
and by many delegations at Rome, but that ultimately the idea of incorporating a
definition of victims from the Declaration, or from any other source, was aban-
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They, too, sought to promote and lend further momentum to that
movement, and the consequence was a Statute that granted to victims a role representing a high-water mark in victims’ participation
in international criminal law. Still, the negotiators at Rome also
clearly rejected the notion that the goal or trend of giving victims a
“voice” could justify ever-expanding participation in ICC proceedings. The objective of providing participation, it was decided,
would not confer the status of a party, for example, nor would it
permit more than the expression of “views and concerns,” indirectly through legal representatives. Boundaries were imposed because of the specific considerations that apply to an international
criminal court: the need to balance the interests of the defense with
the Court’s ability to prosecute efficiently those responsible for the
most serious crimes in the world.
¶87
The weakness in the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I thus
was disregard of the fact that the Statute already answers the important questions of how much of an independent voice and role
the victims were to obtain, and in what ways victims will be enabled to participate in the fight against impunity. Any ellipsis in
the Statute about any general right to participate in the investigation, or any other instance or form of participation, should not be
regarded as a negative space into which additional participation
rights should be granted. Rather, and especially in light of the other distinctions the negotiators plainly made, it should be respected
that the incremental participation was disfavored because of the
consequences for fairness and efficiency.
¶88
Trial Chamber I’s decision that an applicant could obtain the
potential right to participate at trial, regardless of whether he or she
suffered harm from any crime being prosecuted by the ICC, likewise disregarded a fundamental limit: the jurisdiction of the Court.
The dissent of Judge Blattman correctly pointed out that, in any
court, the implicit limitation of the court’s jurisdiction or competence must inform the extent of a participation right. For Trial
Chamber I to permit participation in a trial by victims of crimes
other than the only crimes being tried, in essence, arrogated power
to the Chamber that it does not possess. No court, domestic or international, has even attempted such an expansion of its own authority. The majority opinion’s reliance on the Basic Victims
Principles is infirm, in addition, because the majority either igdoned because the definition was too controversial).
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nored, or failed to appreciate, that the Principles have been adopted
for a critical but different purpose: to express the obligation and
agreement of states to provide redress to all victims of violations
of international humanitarian and human rights law, regardless of
whether perpetrators are identified or punished. The ICC is not a
state, and it has no such broad obligation, nor the capability to fulfill it. As the OPCD has argued in the pending appeals in the DRC
and Darfur situations: the Court “has neither the obligation nor the
power to give effect to the right to a remedy for every potential
victim” of all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.238
¶89
Finally, in certain instances the Chambers have chosen a
balance that appears to have been affirmatively rejected in the
Court’s governing documents. The Statute and the RPE, for example, clearly disapprove granting victims the right to adduce evidence at trial. Those documents declined to give victims the status
of “party” and prohibit victims from even posing questions to witnesses at hearings and trial, absent prior court approval. The negotiators at Rome rejected proposed text granting victims the right to
present evidence.239 Against this background, for Trial Chamber I

238

See 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶ 52; Situation
in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-440, OPCD Appeal Brief on the “Decision
on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and
on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor,” Public, ¶ 53
(Feb. 4, 2008).
239
Compare U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
Int’l Crim. Ct., Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, at 109, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998)
(proposing Art. 68(8) that provided victims’ representatives with a “right to participate in the proceedings with a view to presenting additional evidence needed
to establish the basis of criminal responsibility as a foundation for their right to
pursue civil compensation”), and Proposal Submitted by Canada, at 2,
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L 58 (July 6, 1998) (proposing during Rome negotiations, and as part of an Art. 68(3), the same language contained in the Preparatory Commission draft), with U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., Comm. of the Whole, Working
Group on Procedural Matters, Report of the Working Group on Procedural Matters, at 4, A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/ADD.6 (July 11, 1998) (proposing deletion of Art. 68(8) of the version of the Statute authored by the Preparatory
Commission); see also Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1406 (“a victim
does not enjoy the same rights as other parties to the proceedings. He may not
participate in the investigation undertaken by the Prosecutor, have access to evidence gathered by the parties, nor call witnesses to testify at the hearing”).
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to grant victims the right to lead evidence not only upsets statutory
balances, but risks fostering disrespect of the Statute.
¶90
The additional irony of this aspect of Trial Chamber I’s
decision in the Lubanga case is that it affirmatively undermines the
interests of victims. The negotiators at Rome, in granting the right
of victims’ participation, aimed to promote the understanding that
victims have a role in proceedings in their own right, beyond serving as witnesses.240 The decision of Trial Chamber I directly returns victims to the limited function of furnishing evidence. Even
worse, and as Judge Blattman also suggested, because the decision
has granted victim status to anyone who suffered harm as a consequence of any crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, the victims of
the crimes at issue in the trial are effectively discriminated against,
even in seeking to obtain the limited role of a provider of evidence.
¶91
Favoring the importation of innovations in human rights law
over application of the Statute has not paid rewards. Perhaps most
troubling is the implicit judgment in the ICC’s judicial decisions
that the drafters of the Statute must have failed to regard victims’
rights, and the means of vindicating those rights, with sufficient
seriousness or foresight.
B. Insufficient Regard for Fairness Considerations
¶92

Balances struck in the Rome Statute are inevitably redrawn if
victim participation rights are expanded: balances between the
Prosecutor’s right to independence and the victims’ entitlement to
pursue redress, for example, or between the need to maintain confidentiality of investigative information and to provide victims
with knowledge that might enhance participation. The balance
which is of paramount importance to maintain, however, is the one
between the rights of the accused and the rights of victims. Article
68(3) could not be clearer in repeating and endorsing the basic precept that when victims’ participation is “inconsistent with” the
rights of the accused, victim participation must yield.241
240

Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 12, at 429 (debate at Rome was about
“the role of victims—beyond their auxiliary function as witnesses”); WCRO
Report, supra note 6, at 17 (“the ability of victims to participate before the ICC
independently of providing witness testimony is a key contribution of the Rome
Statute in the effort to recognize and respond to victims’ interests in the work of
the Court”).
241
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68(3) (stating that participation can only take
place “at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court
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¶93

The decisions of the Chambers regarding victim participation
have failed seriously to abide this directive to safeguard defense
rights. The Chambers have embraced the notion that fairness to
the defense should be considered only when the victim seeks to
participate in a specific proceeding, based on reasoning that conferring the “status of victim” does not per se prejudice defense interests. This methodology is infirm. There is no logical basis for
concluding that the Chambers can excuse themselves from considering whether prejudicial effects flow from the initial determination of whether to grant the “status of victim.” If granting the
“status of victim,” in itself, cannot be squared with providing a fair
proceeding, due process or fairness principles, as well as the terms
of Article 68(3), prohibit even the conferring of the theoretical
right.
¶94
In addition, it is becoming clear that creating the “procedural
status of victim” does concretely and unduly prejudice the defense.
Merely the resource diversion and delay in proceedings occasioned
by the adjudication of theoretical rights to participate has already
had significant effects on the content and pace of the Lubanga proceedings. Lubanga’s defense team has also posed, for example,
the fair question of how a Chamber can render rulings that crimes
within the Court’s jurisdiction are likely to have been committed,
based almost exclusively on first-hand accounts by victims, rather
than on evidence presented by the Prosecution and subject to disclosure obligations, without creating an appearance of bias against
the defense. Strangely, the Pre-Trial Chambers appear not to have
foreseen that such issues would arise, and the Appeals Chamber
now is left with the consequences.
¶95
The more recent decision of Trial Chamber I implicates the
rights of the accused even more dramatically, and again impairs
the predictability and efficiency of Court proceedings. If accused
persons can be confronted, at trial, not only by victims of the
crimes with which he or she is accused, but by victims of any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, the burden on the defense, and the prejudice to it, is patently heightened.242 Selecting
and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the
accused and a fair and impartial trial”).
242
There is no assumption that victims uniformly will give evidence tending to
incriminate the defense. Rather, the fact that the defense must prepare to meet
additional evidence, presented by victims, with the risk that the evidence may be
prejudicial, burdens defense rights.
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victims for trial participation based largely on whether the applicant has the ability to enhance the trial evidence and trial issues
will fundamentally alter the relationship between victims and the
defense and also risks lifting the burden of proof from the Prosecution.243
¶96
It can be argued that the Court, in the end, has created a
balance that does nothing to offend defense rights; that is certainly
the view of the Chambers whose decisions are now on review. It is
nonetheless unsettling that the Court, in connection with its first
cases, has been so willing to create genuine questions about
whether it will be compromising due process rights of the defense
to provide incremental benefits to victims. The courting of risk
seems particularly ill-advised given that the Court would achieve
unprecedented success in vindicating victims’ rights if it granted
meaningful participation in the proceedings and by modalities that
are uncontroverted under the Rome Statute. Will the Court, or
States or the public, be satisfied that justice is served by a first
conviction obtained in a manner not so far countenanced in any
domestic or international court system: through testimony, in part
or in whole, offered by victims of crimes not allegedly committed
by the defendant, not proffered by the Prosecution, and not subject
to any disclosure requirements? The Court’s repeated invocation
of the Basic Principles, in effect, without any balancing consideration of human rights declarations establishing the rights of the accused, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,244 or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,245 is a
telling circumstance.
243
In addition, the system envisioned by the majority opinion, as Judge Blattman took pains to point out, imposes significant additional burdens: on victims
to submit two applications to obtain potential and actual participation, on the
Chambers to assess both potential participation and the value of the victims’
information in the context of an evolving record, and on the parties to respond to
the applications to participate as well as the content of the evidence adduced by
victims.
244
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 14(1) (1966) (recognizing right
of all criminal defendants to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal”).
245
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, arts. 10 & 11(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring that
criminal defendants have entitlement to a “fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal” and presumption of innocence).
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C. Over-Estimation of Ability to Manage and Resolve
Applications to Participate
¶97

An additional problem in the Chambers’ approach to victim
participation has been over-confidence in their ability to resolve
applications to participate and provide actual participation.
¶98
The most basic misstep was the decision to establish a twostage process by which, with respect to each and every application,
the status of victim is assessed and then the eligibility to participate
in a specific proceeding determined. The parties have advanced
reasons why this two-part, case-by-case analysis, and particularly
the conferring of a “status of victim,” is not lawful.246 Equally
worthy of consideration is the gross inefficiency. The problem in
the first step is almost self-describing: what is the worth of evaluating hundreds, potentially thousands, of applications to participate
for the purpose of granting a theoretical right to participate in court
proceedings? In addition, because the “status of victim” is available to any applicant who can advance some credible claim that he
or she has suffered harm as a result of any crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction, the step in practice culls only the procedurally deficient applications.
¶99
To date, the Chambers have indeed deferred all analytically
difficult determinations to the second step, a step which has been
completed only rarely. In the investigation stage, for example, in
theory the Pre-Trial Chambers would be considering the effects of
participation on fairness and efficiency, at a minimum, with respect to applications to participate in specific proceedings. In advance of the trial of Lubanga, under Trial Chamber I’s ruling, the
Chamber would be determining whether any of the (currently)
hundreds of applicants to participate in the trial have information
relevant to the issues to be considered at trial, in addition to such
issues as whether disclosure obligations apply to victims. The
burdens imposed by the framework are manifest. Certainly, the
operation of the system suggests that if it is ever truly tested—
meaning either that applicants begin seeking participation in substantially higher numbers or that those who have obtained the pro246
See supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 01/04-01/06-1219, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal Against Trial Chamber I’s 18 January 2008 Decision on Victims’
Participation, Public, ¶ 23 (Mar. 10, 2008).
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cedural status of victim begin routinely seeking to participate in
specific proceedings—the system may simply break down.
¶100
The inclination to add unproductive components to legal
tests, to defer important or difficult analysis, and to underestimate
the time and effort required to apply the legal standards features
too prominently in the ICC’s record on victims’ participation. The
results for victims, as noted in the WCRO report, include: a lack of
progress in granting actual rights to participate,247 “frustration
among applicants,” and “the risk of inconsistent treatment for similarly-situated victims.”248 The WCRO has gone so far as to suggest
that the “onerous application process” and the “lack of clarity surrounding the victim participation scheme” may explain why “the
ICC has seen a far smaller-than-anticipated number of applicants
overall.”249
D. Failure to Prioritize Core Objectives
¶101

Finally, the failure of the ICC to set priorities relating to
victims’ participation with strict reference to its mandate of prosecuting “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community,”250 has worked to the detriment of the efficient proceedings and meaningful victims’ participation. The ICC is under
tremendous pressure to demonstrate that the world’s first permanent international criminal court can deliver international justice
fairly and with efficiency and impact. The element missing from
the record of the Court’s operations is a sense that the Chambers
are holding paramount the implementation of the instances and
forms of victims’ participation most closely connected to the core
business of the Court, the rendering of determinations of guilt and
innocence. Instead, the Court’s decisions have tended to regard
participation as an end in itself, or to define the objective of participation so abstractly that all participation appears equally desirable.
¶102
The Statute and the RPE clearly focus victims’ participation
at the specific junctures in ICC proceedings critical to the mission
of bringing accountability to perpetrators of mass crimes. The
Statute and RPE provide that victims should participate when key
247

WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 5.
See id. at 6.
249
See id. at 56.
250
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Preamble.
248
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determinations altering the course of an investigation or case will
be made, and the issues or interests relevant to victims are sufficiently crystallized that the expression of “views and concerns”
will have high value, without risking disruption of the parties’
roles and responsibilities, or the efficiency of the Court. The Statute and the RPE specify as the moments at which victims should
participate: any decision by the Prosecutor to start an investigation
on his own initiative, any admissibility challenge by a State or defendant, the holding of confirmation hearings and trials, and proceedings regarding reparations.
¶103
It dramatically alters this system to grant participation rights
based on a rationale as unbounded as allowing victims to participate to help “clarify the facts” or “punish the perpetrators of
crimes.”251 Inherent in the Statute, as well as the jurisdiction of
any court, is the notion that not every fact will help bring the
court’s cases to judgment, and not every perpetrator will come before the court, particularly if the court has a limited mandate.
¶104
Victims have been disserved by the Court’s foray into testing
the boundaries of victims’ participation. Although the Chambers
have immersed themselves in participation-related adjudications,
their approach is willy-nilly; there is no collective effort to focus
on decision-making which has the best chance of yielding meaningful participation. For example, applicants to participate in the
Lubanga trial have waited in a queue, some now for years, while
the Chamber managing the Uganda situation has been rendering
participation determinations in a case in which no defendant has
been arrested. The energy devoted to sorting theoretical rights to
participate in the DRC investigation has outstripped the effort to
qualify more than a handful of victims each to participate in the
Lubanga trial and in pre-trial proceedings relating to defendants
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui.
¶105
Finally, the tendency to disregard the link between the extent
and forms of victims’ participation and the Court’s mandate inevitably risks improperly expanding the mandate. Granting applicants
a general right to participate during the investigation phase, for example, cannot help but convert the Court into a forum for general
conflict-related advocacy, as Lubanga’s lawyers have pointed out.
It can easily be considered improper, and unproductive, for the
ICC to be inviting, considering, and opining about issues such as
251

17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 63.
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whether individuals have been victims of crimes within the ICC’s
jurisdiction, when there is no likelihood that the applicants’ allegations will fall within the scope of any case commenced at the ICC.
¶106
The Court’s victim protection responsibilities have also been
expanded in a dramatic and troubling fashion. Because the Rome
Statute imposes an affirmative obligation on the Chambers to protect “victims” and “witnesses,”252 every expansion of the term “victim” brings with it the potential obligation to protect additional individuals and populations. The judges have indeed expressly embraced a responsibility to protect those granted the “status of victim,”253 and, in the case of the majority opinion of Trial Chamber I,
to protect even individuals who have only applied to obtain that
status.254 At the same time, the Court is struggling with the issue
of whether it has the capacity to protect individuals the parties propose to call as witnesses in ICC proceedings.255 The issue becomes
one of whether the ICC’s obligation of protection should be focused on individuals linked to ICC proceedings, or should be expanded to approximate the security responsibilities of a state or aid
organization vis-à-vis populations threatened by conflict.
¶107
In the future, it may develop that participation rights can be
expanded further as experience is gained in the Court. The Court’s
short history, however, strongly suggests that in the near term, par252

See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 57(3)(c).
See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 73 (providing that
Chamber may decide to permit persons “having the status of victims” in the investigation to participate in proceedings it initiates under Art. 57(3)(c), which
provides in pertinent part that the Chamber may “provide for the protection and
privacy of victims”); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶¶ 98-99
(“victims in the context of a situation should be allowed to submit requests
aimed at obtaining the adoption of such measures [i.e., protective measures] by
the Pre-Trial Chamber”).
254
See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 136-37 (providing that while Chamber “readily understands that considerable demands are
made on the Victims and Witnesses Unit and there are undoubted limitations on
the extent of the protective measures that can be provided,” applicants are entitled to protection at “the point at which the application form is received by the
Court,” since filing an application to participate constitutes “appearing before
the Court” within the meaning of art. 43(6) of the Rome Statute).
255
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, Corrigendum to the Decision on the Evidentiary
Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under
Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, Public Redacted Version,
¶¶ 55-63 (Apr. 25, 2008) (determining that it is not sustainable for the ICC to
provide protection to all witnesses deemed by the OTP to be in need and thus
that the OTP must rely on fewer witnesses).
253
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ticipation in ICC proceedings might best be promoted by prioritizing some forms of participation over others, consistent with the
Statute itself. The experience of the first years of the ICC has
served to underscore that it is simply not feasible, productive, or
equitable to equate a “victim” of a conflict to a “victim” entitled to
ICC participation.
V. PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE VICTIM PARTICIPATION
SCHEME
¶108

The matter that the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have
largely avoided discussing—the record of the operation of the victims’ participation framework—must be considered in formulating
a response to the question currently on appeal, asking how applications to participate “must be dealt with.”
¶109
Whether the Appeals Chamber is willing or able, in the
appeals currently being heard, to harmonize the law so that a more
rational and effective system of victim participation results, cannot
be known. On the one hand, Appeals Chamber review cannot help
but set some more unified course, as the appealed questions relate
to both investigations and cases and will apply to all lower Chambers. The Appeals Chamber also has the benefit of having seen the
operation of the victim participation system and the successive decisions of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. Still, the Appeals
Chamber faces some difficult circumstances. The issues on appeal
are undeniably difficult, and none of the lower Chambers made an
effort to engage or discuss opposing or differing rulings. If the
Appeals Chamber were inclined to define the victim participation
right to be any more limited than the lower Chambers, it would
confront the hardship of disappointing expectations built up by the
earlier decisions. Finally, in its prior decisions in interlocutory appeals, the Appeals Chamber has failed to reach unanimity with
some frequency,256 a circumstance which raises the possibility that
256

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06824 OA7, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song Regarding the Participation of Victims, Public, 55 (Appeals Chamber, Feb. 13, 2007) (dissenting
from denial of right of victims to participate in appeal from decision declining to
release Lubanga from custody, and advocating rule that once victims participate
in lower chamber on a matter, their participation should automatically continue
on appeal); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06766 OA7, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pikis to the Order of the Appeals Chamber Issued on 4 December 2006, Public (Appeals Chamber, Dec. 11, 2006) (dis-
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the Chamber may not be able to express the degree of consensus or
certainty which will bring clarity to victims or the proceedings.
¶110
The following consist of measures for consideration over the
short or long term, based on the record of the functioning of the
victims’ participation system in the past years.
A. Disallow Participation in the Investigation Stage Based Solely
on a General Interest in Investigation
¶111

Both the OTP and the OPCD have argued on appeal that the
requirement of an effect on personal interests, pursuant to Article
68(3), cannot be met by an interest so broad and common to all
victims as a general interest in ICC investigations, without rendering Article 68(3) meaningless.257 The alternate way of expressing
the parties’ common position is that there can be no conferring of a
“procedural status of victim”: that status is nowhere recognized
under the Statute or the RPE and it was an error to create such a
status based on a general interest in investigation.258 Before the
Appeals Chamber, the OPCD has contended that the prejudice to
the defense which results from the Chamber considering applications to participate, and rendering decisions about the existence of
crimes and victims, without first being provided with the evidence
and information resulting from the OTP’s investigation, means that
no participation should be permitted before the OTP seeks and obtains warrants of arrest.259
¶112
The Prosecution has contended that the defense position is
not entirely correct, because certain forms of participation are exsenting from order permitting out-of-time filing by victims on the ground that
the order wrongly avoided answering the question of whether victims could participate in the appeal as of right); Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC01/04-450, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the OPCV’s Request for Clarification and the Legal Representatives’ Request for Extension of Time and Order of the Appeals Chamber on the Date of Filing of Applications for Participation and on the Time of the Filing of the Responses thereto by the OPCD and the
Prosecutor, Public (Feb. 13, 2008) (denying request for clarification from OPCD
and request for extension of time filed by legal representatives of victims, noting
that Judge Song dissented, and stating that the reasons for the order and dissent
would follow).
257
See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
258
Id.
259
See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 39-47
(contending that until Prosecutor puts forth evidence and case is commenced,
factual findings regarding the existence of crimes, harms resulting therefrom,
and potential perpetrators unduly prejudice defense).
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pressly provided in the Statute during the investigation phase (i.e.,
in the case of admissibility challenges, or if the Prosecutor proposes to commence a proprio motu investigation, or closes an investigation based on interests-of-justice considerations).260 The
OTP proposes that the right to participate in the investigation,
however, must be limited by permitting participation beyond these
instances only when the applicant demonstrates that his or her personal interests will be affected by the proceeding at issue, and not
by the entire phase of investigation.261 In other words, there should
be no first stage in which any applicant is pre-qualified for a hypothetical right.262 Rather, the Chamber must consider and admit or
deny participation with respect to particular investigation phase
proceedings.263
¶113
The reform strongly suggested by the functioning of the
victims’ participation system since 2006 is adoption of the rule
urged by the OTP in earlier proceedings: to revoke entirely the
general right to participate in the investigation and thus to limit
participation to the investigation-phase proceedings expressly identified in the Statute and the RPE. Pre-Trial Chamber I itself denied
that the general right was required by the Statutory text, and as discussed above, in Part IV.A, the Statute cannot properly be interpreted to follow, without limits, the movement or trend in human
rights law to promote the role of victims. Perhaps equally relevant
is the fact that since the general right to participate in the investigation was granted, over two years ago, no exercise of that right has
260

See, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-123, Prosecution’s Response to OPCD’s Appeal Brief on the “Decision on the Requests of
the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to
Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the and [sic] Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Material,” Public, ¶ 25 (Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter 15 Feb. 2008 OTP Response to OPCD’s Appeal of Supporting Documentation Decision].
261
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 15-17. This position is more expansive than the OTP’s stance
in early proceedings, in which the OTP contended that no investigation-phase
proceedings, other than the ones expressly identified in the Statute, were appropriate for victims’ participation. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
262
See, e.g., 15 Feb. 2008 OTP Response to OPCD’s Appeal of Supporting Documentation Decision, supra note 260, ¶¶ 15-18 (agreeing with defense position
that grant of victim status without any finding other than that applicant is affected by the investigation is contrary to the Statute).
263
See id. ¶ 18. In the view of the OTP, this reform is required by Rule 89(1), at
a minimum, because that rule requires a Chamber, when deciding to accept or
reject an application for participation, to simultaneously “specify the proceedings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate . . . .” See id.

528

ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW

[Vo l. 6

changed any part of any investigation at the ICC. Instead the consequence has been the significant burdening of Court proceedings
and of the victims’ opportunities to obtain more meaningful forms
of participation.
¶114
Returning to providing only the forms of investigation-phase
participation expressly envisioned in the Statute would affirm that
the drafters defined a limit in choosing specific junctures during
investigation at which victims should be permitted to participate.
The proposed reform would also have the benefit of re-focusing
victims’ participation on case proceedings, the main business of
the Court. In the investigation, victims would continue to participate in the proceedings prejudged by the Statute and the RPE to be
the ones in which their personal interests are implicated. The
Court would avoid, however, raising expectations among the millions of conflict-victims that the Court will hear individual requests
to have certain crimes or perpetrators investigated, to obtain protection from the Court, or to have evidence pertaining to each victim, crime, or perpetrator preserved or collected.
¶115
Like denying the general right to participate in the investigation altogether, the OTP-advocated measure of compelling a onestage review, such that applicants to participate must establish an
effect on personal interests in some specific investigation-phase
proceeding, would eliminate the unproductive task of adjudicating
the “procedural status of victim” or theoretical rights to participate
in the investigation. Under either proposal, the Court would regain
the thousands of hours which have been spent on the metaphysical
task of assessing and granting purely theoretical rights to participate in the investigation.
¶116
The shortcoming of the OTP’s recommendation is that it
preserves too much of the open-endedness of the general right.
The OTP’s current proposal appears to envision that applicants
might identify, as investigation-phase proceedings in which participation is appropriate, proceedings other than those expressly
specified in the Rome Statute or the RPE. This flexibility undoubtedly carries conceptual appeal, but it leaves a difficult question unanswered. What investigation-phase proceedings, other
than those already identified in the Statute and the RPE, would sufficiently affect the personal interests of a victim, without unduly
prejudicing defense rights and efficient proceedings, such that participation in those proceedings should be permitted? Failure to anticipate the answer to this question will perpetuate the resource
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drain by again deferring complicated issues for future decisionmaking. In concrete terms, victims will continue to make requests
relating to investigative strategies of the OTP, evidence-gathering,
the protection of witnesses, their own protection, and their legal
representation, to take some examples. The Chambers will carry
on sorting through, on a case-by-case basis, which of these investigation-phase proceedings might or might not affect the personal
interests of the applicants, and/or the fairness and efficiency of
proceedings. Clarity will again be delayed and the gap between
victims’ expectations and the reality of actual participation will
persist.
¶117
To avoid the inefficiency of continuing to define participation through trial and error, the Chambers should confront, in advance, the question of whether there is any specific investigationphase proceeding in which it appears likely that: (1) a victim’s
“personal” interests—as distinguished from the interests common
to all victims within the scope of an investigation—will be affected; and (2) the vindication of those interests will not be outweighed by fairness and efficiency concerns. If consideration of
this question leads to a continued inability to identify any proceeding appropriate for participation, other than those in which victims’
participation is already required by the Statute and the RPE, the
right to participate during the investigation should be pared to the
terms of those governing documents. If there are such proceedings, they should be identified, and the reasoning articulated, to
enable applicants to make informed decisions about whether and
when to seek to participate in ICC proceedings.
B. Define Participation in a Case to Be Limited to Victims of
Charged Crimes
¶118

In the context of cases, the sua sponte decision of Trial
Chamber I to grant the “status of victim” to any victim of any
crime within the situation, or investigation, should be reversed, as
both the OTP and the defense have argued.264
264

See Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga Trial Participation Decision, supra note 186, at 14 (seeking declaration that harm and personal interests
of applicant must be linked to the charges against the accused); Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1219, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s 18 January 2008 Decision
on Victims’ Participation, Public, ¶ 51 (Mar. 10, 2008) (requesting reversal of
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The legal reasons that Trial Chamber I’s ruling must be
revisited have been cogently explored by Judge Blattman in his
dissenting opinion. Incorporating wholesale the definition of victims, as set forth in the U.N. Basic Principles, wrongly ignores the
limit of the competence of the Court and the Trial Chamber, which
is to adjudicate criminal cases. For this reason, applicants to participate in a case, or at trial, should not be deemed to have demonstrated that the case or trial will affect their personal interests
unless they are victims of the crimes being adjudicated by the
Court.
¶120
Observing the competence of the Court will again eliminate
a two-step analysis which promises to be impossible to implement.
As already discussed, in Part IV.C, it verges on folly to undertake
to determine, on a case-by-case basis, and in relation to evidence
which will change and develop, whether any of the thousands or
millions of victims of a crime within a situation may have information relevant to the evidence and issues to be addressed at trial.
¶121
The Trial Chamber’s reason for expanding the definition of
victim vis-à-vis a case is, in any event, a patently improper one.
The Chamber has been frank in acknowledging that the purpose of
the expansion is to permit the Chamber to qualify as “victims” any
individuals who might be in a position to lead evidence, regardless
of whether they suffered harm from the charged crimes.265 Notwithstanding the understandable nature of the Chamber’s curiosity
about the availability of evidence, the Chamber is not permitted
under the Statute and the RPE to engage in investigation, to seek
evidence from other than the parties, or to elevate the standing of
victims to parties. Moreover, as is suggested by Judge Blattman’s
dissent and by the pendency of the appeal, the Trial Chamber can
collect and select evidence only at the cost of raising controversy
about the Court’s commitment to upholding the rights of accused
persons and enforcing the Prosecution’s duty to meet the burden of
proof.
¶122
Returning to the standard endorsed by the Pre-Trial
Chambers thus will restore two limits at once: a proper limit on
participation and likewise on the function of the judiciary. The
majority decision of Trial Chamber I assumes a proposition which
is highly doubtful, especially in advance of any completed trial at
Trial Chamber I’s decision).
265
See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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the ICC: that the massive effort of seeking potential victims who
could serve as witnesses would be repaid by evidence and information that otherwise would not be presented in Court by the parties.
It would be irrational, to say the least, to base ICC legal standards,
and the expenditure of ICC resources, on this extreme and untested
view. More relevant, in any event, is that the Chambers are not
entitled to use victims to enhance the evidence adduced by the
Prosecutor or the defense. The Trial Chamber’s power, and recourse, is to find charges proven or not proven. The Chamber
should be limited to this remedy.
C. Enforce More Rigorously The Requirement That The
“Proceeding” in Question Have an Effect on “Personal Interests”
¶123

Implicit in the measures being proposed is the recommendation that the Chambers assess more rigorously, in the context of
both investigations and cases, the requirement in Article 68(3) that
an applicant demonstrate that the “proceeding” in which he or she
seeks to participate affects his or her “personal interests.”
¶124
Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision to equate an entire phase—
the investigation—with a “proceeding,” and then to find that “personal interests” of victims were affected in general by the investigation proceeding was, as the parties have pointed out, the equivalent of no meaningful determination at all.
¶125
To fulfill the plain meaning of Article 68(3), and to create a
system which promotes, rather than hinders, effective victim’s participation, the two operative terms must be interpreted to have independent substance. The Appeals Chamber has already given
guidance that it would be correct to interpret the term “proceeding”
far more narrowly than to signify an entire phase, such as investigation. Its ruling that victims who participated in the Lubanga
confirmation hearing could not automatically participate in the
proceeding to determine whether leave to appeal the decision confirming charges would be granted, implicitly recognizes two distinct “proceedings,” even between the hearing of a matter and an
appeal on the same question.266 Second, applicants must be required to demonstrate an effect on “personal interests” more specific than an interest he or she shares with all or most of the victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, such as to help
266

See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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to clarify facts or punish perpetrators. The Appeals Chamber,
again, seems inclined to endorse a more restrictive view of the requirement, as in the past it has opined that the “personal interest”
of the applicant, for example, should be one which does not “belong instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor.”267
¶126
Although the Appeals Chamber has not yet had the opportunity to offer elaboration, these rulings suggest that the Chambers
should strive, from the outset of their inquiries, to identify contributions by participating victims that will be unique, or add incremental value to the information already before the Chambers. Participating victims also should be affected by the proceeding at issue in some more direct and tangible way than other victims of the
investigated conflict or even of the charged crimes. These requirements are not a judgment that victims, if permitted to participate to a greater extent, would fail to make valuable contributions
or to obtain a greater sense of redress. Importantly, they should
not be regarded as such. Rather, the requirements reflect the
judgment of the governing Statute to permit victims’ participation,
while giving effect to the limitation of not impairing the core objective of providing fair and efficient Court proceedings.
D. Within a Single-Stage Qualification Process, Limit in the Short
Term the Proceedings in Which Participation will be Granted
¶127

Even assuming that the thus-far unproductive step of
granting of “the status of victim” were eliminated, that trial participation was limited to victims whose harms are linked to the
charges, and that the requirements of Article 68(3) were applied
more rigorously, especially in the investigation phase, there remains the fact that the Chambers will need to undertake case-bycase determinations with respect to a potentially high number of
applicants who may seek to participate in each specific pre-trial
and trial proceedings, at a minimum. A question persists about the
extent to which the Chambers could successfully manage even a
one-step process, if the remaining step does not eliminate the need
for the judges to consider applications to participate in reference to
numerous proceedings and their varied effects on “personal interests” of each of many applicants.

267

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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As is discussed supra in Part V.A, if the Court elects to
retain any right to participation in investigation-phase proceedings,
beyond the instances specified in the Statute and the RPE, it should
simultaneously provide elaboration on the specific investigationphase proceedings in which participation is likely to be permitted—and not permitted.
¶129
In case proceedings, the same winnowing should take place.
Even if the Chambers switched to evaluating, in one step and with
respect to a specific case proceeding only, the effect of the proceeding on personal interests of the applicant and the consequences
for fairness and efficiency, there is still the potential for any applicant to seek to participate, for example, in every discovery or disclosure issue, every issue of victim or witness protection, and all
hearings related to evidentiary challenges. Unless the Chambers
manage further the applications to participate in specific proceedings, they will remain in the open-ended, resource-consuming loop
of attempting to specify, from within some universe of potential
instances of participation, the actual instances of participation that
they will provide.
¶130
It is therefore essential for the ICC to make known some
initial, modest selections about which, if any, case proceedings,
other than the ones specified in the Statute and the RPE, it expects
to be occasions for victims’ participation. The method would be to
disseminate to applicants, in effect, rebuttable presumptions about
the proceedings upon which their efforts to obtain participation
should be focused. The Chambers could in addition permit applicants to demonstrate, on a timetable set by the Court, that a specific, upcoming proceeding not previously favored by the Court for
participation is one in which participation should be allowed.
¶131
To select and publicize certain proceedings in which
participation presumptively will be allowed is dramatically less
ambitious than the current system, but the depth of the resource
drain resulting from the current framework, and its failure to deliver more concrete participation, demonstrates that victims’ participation, at least initially, must be provided in a far more targeted
way. Narrowing the proceedings in which victims’ participation
normally will be allowed will bring multiple benefits. The Court
will be able to provide more and better actual participation to victims. Victims will obtain participation based on the merits of the
applications, rather than the happenstance of having been among
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the few who succeeded in having their applications heard. Prejudice to defendants can be more meaningfully assessed if it arises in
the context of instances of participation. Finally, evaluating concrete requests in the context of a defined subset of proceedings also
will afford the Court the opportunity to gain the experience that
will enable it to assess whether, and at what pace, instances of victims’ participation should be expanded.
¶132
It is fully feasible to define a list of proceedings in which
participation would normally be envisioned, based on the Court’s
experience. It also turns out that this list comprises proceedings in
which the interest of victims is immediately apparent. Victims in
the Lubanga proceeding, for example, have participated in proceedings held when, pursuant to Article 60(3), the Pre-Trial
Chamber undertook the periodic review of its initial decision to
detain Lubanga prior to trial.268 They participated in the confirmation hearing269 and expressed views and concerns regarding the
date of trial.270 When the Trial Chamber has taken up disclosure
issues related to a system or court-wide practice in which victims
will participate—such as the “e-Court protocol,” which sets the
standards and methods by which the Court and the participants will
record and exchange evidence at trial, and information about the
evidence—victims participated.271 On the other hand, victims did
not participate, and generally did not even seek to participate, in
other issues relating to disclosure or evidence.272 The Pre-Trial
268
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-530tEN, Observations of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in Respect of
the Application for Release Filed By the Defence, Public (Oct. 9, 2006).
269
See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
270
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-957tENG, Submissions on Preliminary Issues, Public, ¶¶ 3-5 (Sept. 24, 2007).
271
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1127,
Decision on the E-Court Protocol, Public, ¶¶ 7-8 (Trial Chamber I, Jan. 24,
2008) (noting filings by victims’ representatives).
272
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06658, Decision on the Prosecution Application Pursuant to Rule 81(2) of 3 November 2006, Public Redacted Version, 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 3, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision
on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, Public, 3-5
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 8, 2006); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-718, Decision on Defence Requests for Disclosure
of Materials, Public with Confidential Annex, 1-3 (Nov. 17, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1097, Order on the Prosecution’s Applications for the Lifting of Redactions, Non-disclosure of Information and Disclosure of Summary Evidence, Public, ¶¶ 1-5 (Trial Chamber I, Dec.
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Chamber in the Lubanga case expressly excluded participation in
the instances described above in Part III.C, when victims sought
further information about the OTP investigation in the DRC,273 and
also at hearings when it deemed that victims’ participation was
unlikely to alter the matters under consideration.274
¶133
Identifying a set of core proceedings from which to build
victims’ participation begins to make apparent that the definition
of the participation right need not be amorphous or haphazard.
The current practice does nothing to facilitate the provision of even
the instances or forms of participation that the Chambers and victims would agree should be prioritized. Applicants routinely submit boilerplate containing a blunderbuss request to participate in
all investigation, pre-trial, trial, and reparations proceedings. The
judges, for their part, have indulged in repeatedly offering some
universe of participation possibilities, without reaching decisions
about the permissibility of concrete participation in specific proceedings. A participation system in which the judges and the victims each are speculating about the other’s preferences will never
attain viability or fairness.
¶134
The short-term goal is, then, is to promote clarity and
efficiency by fostering the ability of the Court and the victims to
match expectations about preferred forms of participation. This in
turn will permit a greater volume of views and concerns to be expressed, even if the number of proceedings in which those views
are expressed is modest, at least initially. The next set of challenges relating to victims’ participation and reparations awaits, including, for example, the task of determining to what extent victims will have common or diverse interests, how representation can
effectively be provided when interests are not unified, and the
principles upon which reparations will be rewarded. This circum18, 2007); Transcript in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-T-69-ENG, at 40-63 (Jan. 10, 2008) (parties’ arguments regarding
OTP’s applications for the lifting of redactions, non-disclosure of evidence, and
disclosure of summary evidence).
273
See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
274
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-335tENG, Decision on the Application for Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 in the Status Conference of 24 August 2006, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Aug. 17, 2006) (deciding that because status conference concerns
only technical issues relating to system of disclosure in effect among the Prosecution, Defence and Registry, victims are not authorized to participate in the
conference).
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stance makes it even more crucial to lay a sound foundation, at a
minimum, for resolving the basic question of the proper scope of
the participation right.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR VICTIMS AND VICTIMS’
REPRESENTATIVES
¶135

Finally, the experience of the ICC in attempting to implement meaningful victims’ participation presents lessons for victims
and victims’ representatives. Victims are entitled to insist that the
ICC improve its record of providing concrete and effective forms
of participation, and there are steps victims can take to assist in
attaining that goal. In addition, the record of the past years confirms that victims must be cautious about coming to regard ICC
proceedings as the sole or primary means by which they should
raise views and concerns, or seek justice, accountability, and reparations. The design of the Rome Statute, and the practical limitations on the Court, make it unlikely that more than a minute percentage of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court,
save those who have some direct connection to the crimes being
adjudicated in the Court, can count on obtaining a “day in court” at
the ICC. In addition, the ICC is intended as a court of complementarity: a court that supplements and promotes the efforts of other
courts. For these reasons, it is important that, in addition to participating in ICC proceedings, victims capitalize on the existence
of ICC investigations and cases to promote and demand complementary efforts, including domestic efforts, to bring justice. Victims will not fail to obtain an unprecedented degree of participation
in ICC proceedings, but the interests of all victims of atrocities will
better and more equitably be served if participation in ICC proceedings routinely serves as a jumping-off point for promoting restorative justice in other courts and fora.
A. Requesting Better Responsiveness from the ICC

¶136

Victims, victim representatives, and other interested Court
observers should communicate with the Court, as part of approved
participation; through reports, publications or articles; or by appropriate contacts to Court staff, to urge the Court to: (1) be more
prompt in processing and deciding applications to participate; (2)
be more transparent in disseminating likely timelines and prospects
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for concrete participation in proceedings; and (3) attempt to reach
more unified and clear standards for victims’ participation. Victims and their representatives will also undoubtedly be able to suggest specific measures for improving the victim participation
scheme. Finally, to the extent that applicants believe that they are
failing to obtain the degree of participation they expected, the expectations gap should be described to the Court, so that there can
be analysis and understanding on both sides of why the gap exists,
and measures can be adapted to close the gap, if appropriate.
B. Prioritizing Whether to Seek Participation, and Forms of
Participation Sought
¶137

As is suggested above, victims will be better able to obtain
participation if they are clear about which instances and forms of
participation they are seeking.
¶138
In the first instance, each victim should consider, in relation
to the factual context he or she confronts, whether participation in
court proceedings is a productive means of vindicating his or her
personal rights and interests. While there is understandable interest in participating in the ICC’s proceedings, arguably that interest
has wrongly diverted energies from other victim-based initiatives,
equally important to obtaining restorative justice for victims. Conspicuous examples are presented by the Darfur and Uganda cases.
None of the defendants named in those two cases has successfully
been arrested, and the ICC itself has no power to effectuate arrest.
Victim advocacy to states, the U.N. and other international, regional, and domestic authorities could play a critical role in generating support for arrest efforts, which in the ICC system must be
carried out by states. Victims thus logically should weigh whether
it better serves their interests to stand in line to participate in ICC
proceedings or to organize advocacy in support of arrest efforts
and directed at states or other entities. Victims also could logically
prioritize bringing public attention to the accounts of victims, as a
means of promoting grass-roots support for arrest and transfer.
¶139
Equally important is for victims to identify the ICC
proceedings in which they have the greatest interest in participating. The blunderbuss approach to requesting participation in all
proceedings thus far has impeded the conferring of participation
rights, and it also suggests that victims are not considering, in other
than abstract terms, the desirability of participation. Consideration
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of how and in what ways a victim wants to participate, or is willing
to participate, is important to ensuring that the interests of victims
are not ultimately disserved. In the Darfur situation, for example, a
recent media report has quoted the victims’ representatives for the
twenty-one applicants whose applications were considered by the
Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I as having stated that the applicants at issue preferred to participate in trials.275 The same representatives noted the difficulty in explaining to the victims they
represent why it has been so difficult to obtain decisions on their
applications to participate.276 The missed opportunities here are in
part the responsibility of the Court, but it also is incumbent on victims’ representatives, particularly as the process becomes clearer,
to explain likely outcomes and timetables to victims. In the Darfur
case, the twenty-one applicants waited for between six months and
a year to learn only the dispositions of their requests to participate
in the situation, because the Single Judge deferred considering any
trial participation. Had the applicants understood the limits of potential participation in an investigation, or made clearer their preference to participate at trial, it is entirely possible that they would
have obtained by now the determinations in which they had the
higher interest.
C. Guarding Against the Circumstance that the Prospect of ICC
Participation Distracts From Other Important Means of
Expressing Views and Concerns and Obtaining Justice
¶140

Because it is unlikely that the ICC can serve as an effective
forum for any but a small portion of victims of conflicts, victims
and their representatives should consider that a focus on obtaining
participation in ICC proceedings may wrongly detract from efforts
to pursue other methods of raising and promoting victims’ voices.
ICC participation has been granted only slowly, in a limited fashion, and in highly unpredictable ways, and it is unlikely that reform
will bring any dramatic alteration of this scenario, at least in the
short term. ICC participation also, of necessity, will be concentrated on participation relevant to the ICC’s cases, which are extremely selective, or the issues raised in those cases. It is thus important that victims avoid over-estimating the responsiveness of
275
276

See VRWG Article re Darfur Applicants, supra note 7.
See id.
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the ICC victim participation system, or the degree of expression or
vindication that can be obtained through that system, especially
insofar as victims seek to express views and concerns that relate
broadly to conflicts, their causes, and their consequences and costs.
¶141
Victims might better promote victims’ interests by using the
interest and profile created by the ICC investigation itself, and not
solely the participation right, as a means of raising victims’ voices
about mass crimes. The objective should be to capitalize on the
ICC’s investigation and use it as a platform for the expression of
victims’ views and concerns either about crimes prosecuted by the
Court, or crimes not prosecuted by the Court but within the same
conflict or investigation. Victims vis-à-vis the conflict could use
the ICC’s intervention, for example, as a basis to advocate for domestic prosecutions of like crimes. The ICC intervention also
makes it more likely that international media will have an interest
in victims’ accounts and issues that are important to victims but
beyond the mandate of the ICC. This opportunity should be fully
exploited so that, for example, the ICC intervention can promote
exploration of such issues as the humanitarian crises caused by the
displacement of victim populations.
¶142
Victims also should not neglect to target states and international organizations in expressing views about conflicts and the
crimes they engender, to ensure that victims’ views are not neglected when these entities are called upon to cooperate with the
ICC or to initiate or aid other efforts to mete justice. Victims’ advocates should continue to use ICC investigations as a basis for
using technologies to promote dialogues enabling victims to share
and exchange accounts of their victimization and questions about
justice. The directors of a project called “Interactive Radio for Justice,” for example, have travelled to the DRC and the CAR to record and broadcast via radio victims’ accounts and their questions,
concerns, and hopes about justice in general and the ICC in particular. These accounts are then publicized again through the
internet and are “answered” by radio broadcasts and “web-posts”
of ICC personnel responding to the victims’ statements and questions.277
¶143
The point is that the ICC intervention can promote varied
means of raising victims’ voices, and the objective more produc277

The Interactive Radio For Justice website can be viewed at www.irfj.org (last
visited June 11, 2008).
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tively could be viewed—given the narrowness of ICC proceedings—as one of connecting victims to the cause of justice rather
than to an ability to participate specifically in an ICC proceeding.
D. Share and Disseminate Accurate Information About ICC
Participation
¶144

Outreach efforts carried out by the Court and by NGOs in the
field have been extensive, and predictably one of the great challenges has been disseminating information about the ICC and its
authority and capabilities, in light of a general lack of knowledge,
or affirmative misunderstandings, about the ICC and its work. On
the topic of victims’ participation, it is critical that the Court, victims’ representatives, and other interested observers implement
educational and outreach initiatives which provide victims and affected communities with concrete information, based in the ICC’s
experience to date, about the ICC’s authority and activities, the
likely limit of its work, the forms and likelihood of victims’ participation, and the potential for reparations. It is now possible to
provide specific information which victims are likely to find important: statistics about forms of participation sought and obtained,
the forms of identification that applicants for participation are likely required to submit, or the prospects that a victim can participate
in confirmation or trial proceedings while maintaining anonymity.
While there are many reasons to keep the interchange of information up-to-date, the most significant is that victims are entitled to
make informed decisions about their own interactions with the
Court. The fact that the vast majority of applicants for participation seem to view all options as equal is a disturbing indication that
they are not currently receiving adequate information or guidance
about the choices available to them.
E. Exercise Clear Rights to Participate

¶145

Finally, victims and victims’ representatives should take care
that energies devoted to broadening hypothetical rights, or transforming the “status of victim” to instances of actual participation,
do not divert from expressing “views and concerns” in ways and in
proceedings that the Rome Statute and the RPE clearly and unequivocally identify. The Statute and the RPE specifically author-
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ize participation in a number of proceedings, and also identify
mechanisms by which victims can obtain the participation.
¶146
Victims can easily avail themselves of some of these core
participation rights by the simple step of “communicating” with
the Court. For example, under the Statute and RPE, individuals
who have “communicated” with the Court are eligible to receive
notice of the Prosecutor’s decisions not to investigate or prosecute
under Article 53,278 challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility,279
and Court decisions to hold confirmation hearings.280 Thus, victims who are interested in expressing views and concerns on these
occasions should be encouraged to submit the triggering communications.
¶147
Similarly, it would be fruitful for victims and victims’
representatives to prioritize plans to gather and express views and
concerns in proceedings which are highly likely to occur and in
which victims’ views must be sought, by express direction of the
Statute and the RPE. The Lubanga confirmation hearing, for example, was widely seen as a victory (and a very high-profile one)
for the cause of victim participation, because victims and their representatives dramatically demonstrated the unique value of the expression of victims’ views and concerns. In a similar fashion, victims’ views, for example, are likely to be critical if the admissibility of the Darfur case is challenged by the Sudanese Government,
or if “interests of justice” applications are brought to the Chamber
assigned to the Uganda case, in light of peace talks between the
Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan government. These proceedings will determine if ICC trials of accused persons ever take
place in those cases. For this reason, it would be astute for victims
and their representatives to plan for participation in these proceed278

See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 53(1)(c) & 51(2)(c) (Prosecutor may
choose not to investigate or prosecute on grounds of interest of justice); RPE,
supra note 17, R. 92(2) (in order to allow participation, the Court shall notify
victims concerning the decision of the Prosecutor not to prosecute pursuant to
Article 53).
279
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 19 (Court, parties, and states may seek
determinations on admissibility) & art. 53(1)(c); RPE, supra note 17, R.
59(1)(b) (Registrar should inform victims who have communicated with the
Court of any question or challenge of jurisdiction or admissibility).
280
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 61 (entitled “Confirmation of the
Charges Before Trial”); RPE, supra note 17, R. 92(3) (in order to allow participation, the Court shall notify victims of decisions to hold confirmation hearings).
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ings first, and to file applications to participate in trial after it has
been ascertained that trials will indeed occur.
VII. CONCLUSION
¶148

The great experiment of incorporating victims’ participation
into international criminal proceedings has had important successes. Moreover, the best of intentions, and a willingness to devote vast amounts of time and energy, feed the continuing efforts
to make the venture a productive one for victims and for international criminal justice together. For the reasons discussed, it remains the case that the experiment is ongoing. The judges of the
International Criminal Trial for Rwanda predicted, in the course of
determining not to undertake to provide reparations to victims at
that court, that such a scheme “would not be efficacious, would
severely hamper the everyday work of the Tribunal and would be
highly destructive to the principal mandate of the Tribunal.”281
The specter of this prediction proving true for the ICC victim participation scheme cannot entirely be discounted. A consideration
of empirical outcomes, prompt correction of courses found to be
unproductive, and the exercise of discipline in estimating the
Court’s true capacity, will be critical—and would always have
been necessary—to successful implementation of an innovative
victim participation scheme. In addition, the value of achieving
modest short-term goals, to preserve possibilities of providing
more extensive forms of participation in the longer term, both at
the ICC and elsewhere, should never be underestimated. To do no
harm to the aspiration of restorative justice for victims should be
the first principle. Constructing a sound foundation for further efforts to serve the dignity and well-being of victims of mass crimes
would be precisely the attainment to which the drafters of the
Rome Statute aspired.

281

WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 12 n.31 (quoting Letter dated 9 November
2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to Letter of the UN Secretary-General
to the Security Council dated 14 December 2000, U.N. Doc S.2000/1198).
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ADDENDUM
(Notes to Chart: Adjudication of Applications to Participate)
i

See text discussion infra in Part III.A (explaining how figures were derived).
For the numbers assigned in the DRC situation, see Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC/01/04-01/07, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0327/07 to
a/0337/07 and a/0001/08, Public, 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Apr. 2, 2008) ) [hereinafter Decision re Katanga Case Participation] (noting applicant number
a/0337/07 and a/0001/08). Only one number has been assigned with an “08”
suffix (a/0001/08) and there appear to have been a total of 337 applicants in the
DRC situation in the years 2006 and 2007, because no number from 1 to 337 is
duplicated in those years, despite the change in suffix from “06” to “07.” See
also 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 1 (referencing six additional applicants in the DRC situation, given designations VPRS 1 to VPRS 6).
In the Uganda situation, see 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at
1 (noting applicant number a/0127/06 in the Uganda situation). For the Darfur
situation, see 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 1 (noting
applicant number a/0038/07 in the Darfur situation).
ii

The figure for the DRC situation is summed from the decisions calling for observations of the parties: Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-73,
Decision on Protective Measures Requested by Applicants 01/04-1/dp to 01/046/dp, Public Redacted Version, 2-3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, July 21, 2005) (authorizing filing of observations regarding applicants who later were designated
“VPRS 1” to “VPRS 6,” see 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 4
n.4); Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-147, Decision Appointing
Ad Hoc Counsel and Establishing a Deadline for the Prosecution and Ad Hoc
Counsel to Submit Observations on the Applications of Applicants a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 18, 2006); Situation in the DRC,
Situation No. ICC-01/04-228, Décision autorisant le dépôt d’observations sur les
demandes de participation à la procédure a/0004/06 à a/0009/06, a/0016/06 à
a/0063/06 et a/0071/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Sept. 22, 2006); Situation
in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-241, Décision autorisant le dépôt
d’observations sur les demandes de participation à la procédure a/0072/06 à
a/0080/06 et a/0105/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Sept. 29, 2006); 23 May
2007 DRC Decision Authorizing Observations, supra note 147 (calling for observations on seventy-five applications); Situation in the DRC, Situation No.
ICC-01/04-358, Decision authorising the filing of observations on applications
for participation in the proceedings, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, July 17, 2007)
(calling for observations on twenty-five applications); Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-182, Decision Authorising the Filing of
Observations on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings a/0327/07
to a/0337/07 and a/0001/08, Public (Feb. 7, 2008) (calling for observations on
twelve applications to participate in case).
iii

These numbers are drawn from the decisions adjudicating participation rights.
In the DRC situation, see 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 41
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(granting six applicants, VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, status of victim vis-à-vis situation);
Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr, Corrigendum à la «
Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure deposées dans le cadre
de l’enquête en République démocratique du Congo par a/0004/06 à a/0009/06,
a/0016/06 à a/0063/06 a/0071/06 à a/0080/06 et a/0105/06 à a/0110/06,
a/0188/06, a/0128/06 à a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06,
a/0220/06 à a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06, a/0230/06, a/0234/06 à a/0236/06,
a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 à a/0233/06, a/0237/06 à a/0239/06
et a/0241/06 à a/0250/06 », Public, 57-58 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 31, 2008)
[hereinafter Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation] (correcting decision initially issued on December 24, 2007, and granting sixty-eight applications
to participate in the investigation, including a/0105/06); Decision re Katanga
Case Participation, supra n. i, at 13 (granting five applicants the status of victim
vis-à-vis the situation). For decisions relating to the Lubanga and Katanga
cases, see 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13 (granting one applicant, a/0105/06, the status of case victim); 31 July 2006 Lubanga
Case Decision, supra note 43, at 16 (granting three applicants, a/0001/06,
a/0002/06 and a/0003/06, the status of victim vis-à-vis case and situation); Decision re Katanga Case Participation, supra n. i, at 13 (granting five applicants
the status of victim vis-à-vis the case). Note that in the DRC situation, unlike in
the Uganda situation, victims vis-à-vis the case are automatically considered to
have obtained the status of victim in the investigation. See id. at 13. For the
Uganda situation, see 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 61
(six applicants granted the right to participate in the case, two in the situation,
and one of these granted participation rights in both case and situation); Second
Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 74, at 70 (granting eight victims
right to participate in case, seven in situation; two of these were admitted in both
case and situation). In the Darfur situation, the single decision issued thus far
granted eleven applicants the status of victim vis-à-vis the situation only. See 6
December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 23.
iv

Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation, supra n. iii, ¶¶ 23, 24 & 58
(adjudging as improper two applications and denying third, insofar as it sought
participation in investigation); DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1
to VPRS 6, supra note 41, at 8-9 (denying requests of VPRS 1 to 6 to participate
in case); 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13 (denying
fifty-eight applications insofar as they sought participation in case); Decision re
Katanga Case Participation, supra n. i, at 13 (denying six applicants the status of
victim vis-à-vis the case); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶¶
138-44 (implicitly denying participation in case to an applicant granted status of
victim in investigation); Second Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note
74, ¶¶ 75-81, 91-97, 130-36, 167-73 & p. 70 (expressly denying one applicant
status of victim in investigation; implicitly denying applications of four others
who were admitted to participate in the situation); 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 23 & ¶¶ 31, 33 (denying ten applicants status of victim
in situation but also characterizing three of the ten applications rejected as incomplete).
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v

The figures in this column are derived by subtracting the number of applications granted or denied, in the situation and case respectively, from the applications forwarded to the Chamber.
vi

In the Uganda situation, the Chamber has thirty-seven applications pending in
both the situation and case, despite the granting of the status of victim vis-à-vis
the situation to fifteen of forty-nine applicants, and the denying of the status of
victim to fifteen of forty-nine applicants, because three of the same applicants
were granted participation rights in both the situation and case. See 10 August
2007 Decision, supra note 47, at 61 (six applicants granted the right to participate in the case, two in the situation, and one of these granted participation
rights in both the case and situation); Second Decision re Uganda Participation,
supra note 74, at 70 (granting eight victims right to participate in the case, seven
in the situation; two of these were admitted in both the case and situation).
vii

In the Darfur situation, all twenty-one applications considered by the Chamber
thus far have been deferred and therefore remain pending, insofar as the case is
concerned. See 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, ¶ 8.

viii

These dates are contained in the decisions rendered by the Chambers. See 17
January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 2 (VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 filed applications to participate in June 2005); Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation, supra n. iii, at 3 (most recently filed application under consideration was
filed in April 2007); Decision re Katanga Case Participation, supra n. i, at 2
(twelve applications under consideration were filed by the Registry on January
30, 2008); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 2-3 (forty-nine
applications under consideration were filed between June 2006 and November
2006); 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 3, 5 (twenty-one
applications under consideration were filed either in June 2006 or July 2007).

